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I. INTRODUCTION
At the COALA1 Blockchain Workshop held in Sydney, Australia, in
December 2015,2 conference goers walk past a metal flower art instal-
lation as they enter the auditorium to attend a panel session at the
Powerhouse Museum. The uncurious observer might think the metal
flower a mere statue. A closer look, however, reveals the flower repre-
sents an autonomous life-form affectionately referred to as a “Plan-
toid.”3 A Plantoid, not owned by any one benefactor, derives its
existence from a specialized form of computer code called a decentral-
ized autonomous organization (DAO).4 If an onlooker passing by the
Plantoid sufficiently appreciates the Plantoid’s artistic qualities, the
onlooker may send a donation to the Plantoid through the decentral-
ized virtual currency called bitcoin.5 The onlooker sends the bitcoin
directly to a wallet owned by the Plantoid itself. As an expression of
gratitude for the funds transfer, the Plantoid performs a dance for the
onlooker.6 Once the Plantoid raises sufficient funds, the Plantoid ad-
1. COALA stands for the Coalition of Automated Legal Applications, which is a
multi-stakeholder, international, collaborative research-and-development initia-
tive focused on blockchain technologies, smart contracts, and decentralized appli-
cations. For more information, see COALA, http://coala.global [https://perma.unl
.edu/NZP5-H9VE].
2. BLOCKCHAIN WORKSHOPS: SYDNEY EDITION, http://sydney.blockchainworkshops
.org/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/CMR8-777H].
3. I’m a Plantoid: A Blockchain-Based Life Form, OKHAOS, http://okhaos.com/plan
toids [https://perma.unl.edu/8DMB-GU4N].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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vertises for, selects, and commissions an artist to create a new Plan-
toid.7 In other words, all on its own, the Plantoid’s computer code
enables it to find ways to reproduce.
The advances in technology that enable art to autonomously own
assets and reproduce have the potential to alter myriad traditional
structures. Predicting that such changes include autonomously acting
machines conducting businesses with other machines, one writer sug-
gests that “[s]oon it’s just the law in the way, not the technology any-
more.”8 But what if the law was not in the way? What if, instead, the
law equally experienced transformation induced by the very same ad-
vances in technology that propel the Plantoid to reproduce? Indeed,
Sweden’s current efforts to transfer its real-property recording system
to the blockchain,9 Cook County, Illinois,’ efforts to test a similar sys-
tem,10 Delaware’s efforts to allow corporations to issue shares on the
blockchain,11 Dubai’s plans to issue blockchain-based government doc-
uments,12 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ inter-
est in using blockchain systems to manage health data,13 and the
European Union’s research into blockchain-based regulation for finan-
7. Id.
8. HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM 67 (2016).
9. Pete Rizzo, Sweden Tests Blockchain Smart Contracts for Land Registry,
COINDESK (June 16, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/sweden-blockchain-smart-
contracts-land-registry [https://perma.unl.edu/5556-44FD].
10. JOHN MIRKOVIC, COOK CTY. RECORDER OF DEEDS, BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM:
FINAL REPORT (2017), http://cookrecorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-
Report-CCRD-Blockchain-Pilot-Program-for-web.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZN3
D-YUWJ].
11. Pete Rizzo, Delaware Governor Signs Blockchain Bill into Law, COINDESK (July
24, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-governor-signs-blockchain-legisla-
tion-law [https://perma.unl.edu/4CFA-LP4Z].
12. Michael del Castillo, Dubai Wants All Government Documents on Blockchain by
2020, COINDESK (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/dubai-government-docu
ments-blockchain-strategy-2020 [https://perma.unl.edu/HA2A-DXNG].
13. Joseph Bradley, U.S. Department of Health Calls for Blockchain Research,
CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/u-s-depart
ment-of-health-calls-for-blockchain-white-papers [https://perma.unl.edu/JQ2J-J7
B9]. State governments are also interested in applying blockchain-based systems
to improve government processes. Illinois issued a Request for Information in
December 2016, explaining that one of the three areas of focus of its Illinois
Blockchain Initiative includes “exploring specific Blockchain and distributed
ledger applications and prototypes for use in Illinois government.” CRAIG HOLLO-
WAY, DEP’T OF INNOVATION & TECH., STATE OF ILLINOIS: REQUEST FOR INFORMA-
TION (RFI): DISTRIBUTED LEDGER AND BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 3 (2016), https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Documents/BlockchainInitia
tive/RFI+Blockchain+and+Distributed+Ledger+Applications+in+the+Public+Sec
tor.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7TSR-6BFM]. Illinois stated that its specific areas
of interest include: (1) identity, attestation, and ownership registries; (2) compli-
ance and reporting ledgers; (3) benefit and entitlement ledgers; and (4) a group of
new products and services including escrow as a service, governmental distrib-
uted ledgers, and securing the Internet of Things infrastructure. Id. at 5–6.
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cial institutions14 suggest that such legal transplants are already
underway.
Current strands of law-and-technology literature suggest that
technology can both help regulators more efficiently tailor law to rap-
idly changing industries15 and help citizens understand their obliga-
tions more clearly.16 Meanwhile, others argue that applying these
advances in technology to the law will only lead to new difficulties.17
In particular, scholars voice concern over the potential for technology
to spread and institutionalize the bias of its developers.18 Taken to-
gether, then, the literature suggests that although technology has the
potential to make law more efficient and precise, it also introduces
new perils. But what if shifting attention to the Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) that powers the Plantoid, which has not yet been
systematically considered for its impact on lawmaking, could increase
efficiency, precision, and clarity, and could do so in a transparent way
that would help root out systemic bias? Herein lies the promise of
“crypto-legal structures”: the law of any subject matter implemented
and delivered through smart-contracting, semi-autonomous crypto-
graphic computer code.
This Article reveals the emergence of crypto-legal structures and
examines their potential for generating new legal discourse around
theories of legal process, lawmaking, adjudication, and academic in-
quiry. DLT offers an opportunity to construct new legal structures
which will give rise to new substantive legal issues and cause shifts in
legal culture and legal structures. As these new structures emerge,
they will endogenously reorder inquiries into the nature of law gener-
ally. This Article aims to conceptualize cryptolaw as a disruptive legal
discourse that anticipates the new issues arising from the emerging
phenomena of crypto-legal structures.
This Article advances the literature in three primary ways. First,
this Article turns the current academic discussion relating to DLT and
crypto-currencies on its head. Most of the existing literature focuses
14. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 19.
15. Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation—
From Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2808044 [https://perma.unl.edu/NNG6-UCNQ].
16. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing the potential for microdirectives to emerge
from advances in predictive technology and predicting that microdirectives will
eliminate the traditionally dichotomous choice between rules and standards
faced by lawmakers).
17. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4, 11 (2014) (describing the process
by which human biases are embedded into the source code of predictive algo-
rithms and describing the lack of transparency into the formulas as examples of
these new difficulties).
18. Id. at 13–16.
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on how to regulate the technology19 and its various uses.20 This Arti-
cle instead considers whether and to what extent DLT will alter the
way we think about law itself. While some scholars have considered
whether and how DLT may disrupt specific subject areas,21 this Arti-
cle examines DLT’s broader implications for lawmaking and regula-
tion. Second, this Article builds on two strands of the law-and-
technology literature. Specifically, this Article connects insights from
one strand, which looks at the effects of predictive technology on regu-
lation and consumer protection,22 to the other strand, which looks at
how the code that constitutes the basic building blocks of new technol-
ogy can itself serve as a form of law,23 and uses those connections to
19. Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191 (2016)
(proposing a technology-enabled endogenous form of DLT regulation); see Michael
Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359 (2016) (arguing
that cryptocurrencies can be used to create peer-to-peer law that governs DLT,
even open-source DLT); Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized
Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 12, 2015) (un-
published manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 [https://perma.unl.edu/
E39V-QFCG] (proposing self-regulation for DLT and arguing that users will cre-
ate their own rules to govern transactions).
20. See, e.g., Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Reg-
ulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144 (2014); Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory
Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, 3 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1 (2014); Kevin V. Tu
& Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271 (2015); Even Hewitt, Note, Bringing Continuity to
Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law as a Guide to the Asset Categorization of
Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 619 (2016); Ed Howden, Comment, The Crypto-
Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain Future, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
741 (2014); Marcel T. Rosner & Andrew Kang, Note, Understanding and Regulat-
ing Twenty-First Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 649 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015) [herein-
after Fairfield, BitProperty] (examining the potential for DLT disruption in the
area of property law); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Con-
sumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2014) [hereinafter Fair-
field, Bitcoin Bots] (discussing the possibility of DLT disruption in the area of
contract law); Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19 (arguing that rules for private-
law issues will arise through a form of DLT common law).
22. See, e.g., Benjamin Alaire, Anthony Niblett & Anthony Casey, Law in the Future,
66 U. TORONTO L.J. 423 (2016); Benjamin Alaire, The Path of the Law Towards
Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443 (2016); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016) [hereinafter Casey &
Niblett, Self-Driving Laws]; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17; Casey & Niblett,
supra note 16; Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 15.
23. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE VERSION 2.0
(2d ed. 2006); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1275 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of
Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1405 (1999); David G. Post, What
Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439
(2000).
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reveal the potential power of crypto-legal structures. Third, this Arti-
cle uses comparative legal methodology to conceptualize the impact of
crypto-legal structures on the foundations of the law itself. This Arti-
cle demonstrates that by treating computer code as a foreign legal sys-
tem, methodological tools from comparative law enables lawmakers
and regulators to predict the broader ramifications of shifting existing
legal rules to crypto-legal structures. In doing so, the Article reveals a
legal world with more overlap between legal systems, simplified sub-
stantive law, new regulatory agents, legal culture heavily influenced
by computer software developers, and an evaporating gap between the
law-in-action and the law-in-the-books. By connecting the literature
on DLT, law and technology, and comparative law, this Article offers a
conceptual framework for a new legal discourse and jurisprudence of
cryptolaw and argues that cryptolaw will fundamentally change the
way law is implemented, updated, experienced by citizens, and
adjudicated.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly describes DLT
and smart contracts. Part II proposes the conceptual contours of
crypto-legal structures, outlines two concrete examples of crypto-legal
structures, and addresses the anticipated concern that crypto-legal
structures and cryptolaw are just another “law of the horse.”24 Using
comparative law as a methodological tool, Part III analyzes crypto-
law’s potential to disrupt discourse regarding the fundamental ele-
ments of law: substantive law, legal structure, and legal culture. Part
IV examines the feasibility of adopting crypto-legal structures and ex-
plores the implications and broader consequences of cryptolaw’s emer-
gence. A final Part concludes.
II. A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY PRIMER
This Article begins by offering a brief introductory explanation of
“distributed ledger technology” (DLT). This Article uses the term dis-
tributed ledger technology, or DLT, to refer broadly to distributed net-
work technology that (1) enables users to upload programs and to
leave the programs to self-execute; (2) maintains a public, tamper-re-
sistant record (ledger) of the current and past states of every program;
(3) is distributed; (4) uses public key cryptography for authentication;
and (5) uses a consensus mechanism to ensure that the network main-
tains the technology.25 This Article adopts this definition because it is
broad enough to encompass various forms of DLT, including the
24. For a full explanation of the origin of and debate surrounding the phrase “the law
of the horse,” see infra notes 93, 150–155 and accompanying text.
25. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 191 n.1 (citing Vitalik Buterin, Visions, Part 1: The
Value of Blackchain Technology, ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015), https://blog.
ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchain-technology
[https://perma.unl.edu/4EJG-KJKA]).
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Bitcoin blockchain, the Ripple Protocol, Ethereum, and others.26 Al-
though subtle, an important point is that the term DLT, as used in
this Article, is broad enough to encompass both proprietary (permis-
sioned) DLT and open-source (permissionless) DLT.27 With these
boundaries of the term DLT in mind, section II.A. first offers a brief
introduction to the technology and its variants. Section II.B. then in-
troduces the concept of smart contracts, which are enabled by DLT
and will form the building blocks of crypto-legal structures.
A. Distributed Ledger Technology: Bitcoin’s Blockchain,
Ethereum, and Beyond
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) refers to computer software
that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks,28 and offers a
transparent,29 verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management
26. For further explanation see infra note 29. Note, furthermore, that this Article’s
definition of DLT is not intended to limit DLT protocols to database functions.
DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 88 (“So if you can’t help but have to think of a
blockchain as a database, then this can be thought of as database triggers firing
off after a state change. That’s nothing new, obviously. But again, the innovation
is that this happens simultaneously on all nodes of the network and can’t be
stopped. Plus, that anything going in must be digitally signed by an account
holder. Which is nothing like a database. It’s a blockchain.”).
27. This stands in contrast to other work in this space, which has focused heavily on
the Bitcoin blockchain, where the DLT at issue is open-source. See, e.g., Angela
Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Considera-
tion of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 843 (2015) (defin-
ing the Bitcoin Blockchain as “peer-to-peer open-source software that operates to
create and maintain a distributed public ledger” (footnotes omitted)).
28. Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Mem-
ber LLC, 108 NW. L. REV. ONLINE 1485, 1488 (2014) (“Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer
software system, which means, practically speaking, that the entire system is
made up of versions of the software that end-users download and run on their
personal computers. There is no Bitcoin server or Bitcoin company that directly
manages the system.” (emphasis omitted)).
29. Note that this Article uses “transparent” instead of “public” to define the nature
of the ledger. This intentional choice keeps the definition of DLT broad enough to
encompass both permissionless and permissioned ledgers. The open-source, or
permissionless, DLT are generally public ledgers, open for anyone to inspect.
Walch, supra, note 27, at 840 & n.15. Permissioned DLT, on the other hand, are
developed and used on a proprietary basis and are often not public. Id. Neverthe-
less, in such permissioned DLT, it is possible to give keys to certain outsiders
(e.g., regulators) for the purpose of inspecting the ledger. As such, permissioned
DLT remains transparent, even if it is not public in the same way as permis-
sionless DLT. I am aware of objections to the idea of “permissioned” DLT insofar
as the concept necessarily means the permissioned ledger is not as decentralized
as the permissionless originals. I do not engage that debate here and do not in-
tend to do so. Because permissionless DLT exists and is in use, this Article takes
the position that any legal discussion of DLT must consider both forms of DLT.
Otherwise, whatever paradigm put forth risks missing important implications for
the law. To that end, my use of the term “distributed ledger technology” as op-
posed to “decentralized ledger technology” is intentional. I suggest that permis-
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system maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a
trusted third-party intermediary30 that guarantees execution.31 DLT
is essentially “a chronological database of transactions recorded by a
network of computers”32 that “has rules and built-in security . . . and
. . . maintains internal integrity and its own history.”33 In other
words, DLT “provide[s] a distributed yet provably accurate re-
cord . . . [such that] everyone can maintain a copy of a dynamically-
updated ledger, but all those copies remain the same, even without a
central administrator or master version.”34 By “combining peer-to-
peer networks, cryptographic algorithms, distributed data storage,
and a [sic] decentralized consensus mechanisms,”35 DLT offers a
mechanism, maintained by a distributed network over which no one
person or entity maintains control, for managing transactions and en-
suring the transactions are executed.36 One of the most well-known
examples of DLT is the Bitcoin37 blockchain.38 The Bitcoin blockchain
encrypts transactions and breaks them into smaller sets of aggregated
transactions called “blocks.”39 A block groups transactions, marks
sioned and permissionless ledgers are both distributed, but only permissionless
ledgers have the potential to be truly decentralized, recognizing, of course, that at
present, certain purported decentralized permissionless ledgers are not very de-
centralized at all.
30. Bayern, supra note 28, at 260 (describing this feature of DLTs as a “decision to
avoid what network theorists call a trusted third party—that is, an authority,
above reproach, that can inform others of the canonical state of the system” (em-
phasis omitted)).
31. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 5.
32. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19, at 6 (citation omitted); see also PAUL VIGNA &
MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND DIGITAL
MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 124 (2015) (“The
blockchain doesn’t live on a single computer or server but . . . is shared around
that community of computer owners, or nodes.” (emphasis omitted)).
33. DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS
TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 7 (2016), http://www.dtcc.com/news/
2016/january/25/blockchain-white-paper.
34. Kevin Werbach, Trustless Trust 2 (Aug. 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (foot-
note omitted), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757380.
35. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19, at 4–5.
36. Fairfield, Bitcoin Bots, supra note 21, at 36.
37. In technology circles, the Bitcoin software, protocol, and network are referenced
using the upper case “Bitcoin” while the lower case “bitcoin” refers to individual
units of account. Walch, supra note 27, at 846 & n.41 (citing Vocabulary, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary [https://perma.unl.edu/3R8G-STQT]).
38. J. ANTHONY MALONE, BITCOIN AND OTHER VIRTUAL CURRENCIES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 35 (2014); Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Note & Comment, Speculative Tech: The
Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85,
88–89 (2014) (“The Bitcoin peer-to-peer network that allows for miners to gener-
ate Bitcoins also serves as a public ledger for all Bitcoin transactions. A times-
tamp server records the time of creation of each Bitcoin and any other Bitcoin
transaction within the network. The full record of transactions is called a block
chain, a sequence of records composing a virtual ledger.” (footnotes omitted)).
39. MALONE, supra note 38, at 35.
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them with a timestamp, and connects them to the previous block in
the chain of transactions, leading to the name blockchain.40 New
blocks of transactions are only added to the chain after they have been
verified.41
Although the precise mechanics of building and maintaining the
ledger vary, most DLTs use two techniques to confirm and secure
transactions. First, most DLTs use cryptographic public–private key
pairs to secure and authorize an entry in a ledger.42 The public key
acts as a publicly identifiable address to which transactions may be
directed (like a bank account or email address), while the private key
allows the person or entity to whom the public key corresponds to orig-
inate transactions (the way a bank-account PIN authorizes its holder
to originate funds transfers or an email password allows its holder to
originate messages).43 This cryptographic key pair enables secure
peer-to-peer transactions by ensuring that only the holder of the pri-
vate key can initiate the transaction.44 For example, when an on-
looker appreciates the Plantoid enough to give the Plantoid bitcoin,
the onlooker uses her private key to initiate the funds transfer to the
Plantoid’s public key (its “bitcoin wallet address”). Once received by
the Plantoid, the onlooker can trust that only the Plantoid can spend
the bitcoin because a new transaction with that bitcoin can only be
40. ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN xix, 160 (2015); see also Fair-
field, BitProperty, supra note 21, at 814 (“The Bitcoin protocol creates a ledger
out of a series of groups of transactions, termed simply ‘blocks,’ which as a whole
form a log of all transfers, termed the ‘block chain.’ The block chain is not main-
tained by any single entity, but instead relies on a mathematically innovative
consensus model.” (footnotes omitted)).
41. Abramowicz, supra note 19, at 371 (“The block chain includes only transactions
that are verified as legitimate.” (footnotes omitted)).
42. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Comment, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Cur-
rency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 117
(2012).
43. Reyes, supra note 19, at 200. For example, when a user of the Bitcoin Blockchain
sends bitcoin to another Bitcoin Blockchain user, the bitcoin holder uses his or
her private key to authorize the transfer of bitcoin to the public address repre-
senting the recipient’s wallet. Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Launder-
ing: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND. L.J. 441, 446 (2014); see also
Bayern, supra note 28, at 260 (“Just as someone without my password could not
log into my credit union account, someone without my private Bitcoin keys could
not spend my bitcoins.”).
44. Abramowicz, supra note 19, at 372 (“A mathematical technique can be used to
quickly generate two keys of a specific length (say, 256 bits). One of the keys can
be used to scramble a communication, and the other key can then unscramble it.
This method can be used to authenticate documents. For example, a ‘hash func-
tion’ can create a short code from a document, essentially a fingerprint. The au-
thenticator then scrambles (encrypts) this code using the private key. The public
key can be used to decrypt it, producing the original hash. Thus, anyone who
knows the relevant algorithms and the public key can conclude, with near cer-
tainty, that someone who knew the private key corresponding to the public key
must have performed the encryption.” (footnotes omitted)).
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initiated by the Plantoid’s use of the unique private key corresponding
to its public key.
Most DLTs also use some form of incentivized network consensus
to verify the accuracy of transactions pushed to the ledger.45 “Consen-
sus means that participants in a network have confidence that what
they see on their ledgers is accurate and consistent.”46 In the case of
the Bitcoin blockchain, the consensus method is referred to as mining,
a process by which nodes47 vote on the correct state of the ledger such
that “[e]very full node sees every transaction, and there is only one
consensus ledger mirrored across every machine on the network.”48 To
prevent cheating and ensure the validity of the ledger, the Bitcoin
blockchain uses a proof-of-work49 consensus process in which Bitcoin
blockchain nodes solve complex mathematical problems to validate
each block.50 Solving the mathematical problems, which are “crypto-
graphic puzzles involving one-way functions known as hashes,” re-
quires intense and expensive computing power.51 The difficulty and
expense of validating a block deters cheating and fraudulent
verification.52
45. SIGRID SEIBOLD & GEORGE SAMMAN, CONSENSUS: IMMUTABLE AGREEMENT FOR THE
INTERNET OF VALUE 2 (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/
2016/06/kpmg-blockchain-consensus-mechanism.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
P7GH-DQRF]; see also Abramowicz, supra note 19, at 373 (describing the Bitcoin
Blockchain solution for verifying transactions by consensus).
46. Werbach, supra note 34, at 25.
47. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 9 n.4 (“A ‘node’ is usually one computer, no matter the
size. But more strictly, it’s one instance of a client program running. This could
be multiple times on one and the same computer. In which case, that computer
would be said to host multiple nodes.”).
48. Werbach, supra note 34, at 26.
49. A proof-of-work consensus model “require[s] the client requesting the service
prove that some work has been done” in order to process the request. PEDRO
FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND ECONOMICS
102 (2015).
50. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 40, at xx (describing a miner as “[a] network node
that finds valid proof of work for new blocks, by repeated hashing”); FRANCO,
supra note 49, at 103 (“To secure the blockchain—the distributed transaction
database—Bitcoin requires proof-of-work to be performed on blocks of transac-
tions following the Solution-Verification protocol.”); MALONE, supra note 38, at
36.
51. Werbach, supra note 34, at 27.
52. Id.; see also Bayern, supra note 28, at 261–62 (“The precise mechanism by which
Bitcoin produces this authoritative sequence is complex, but in short, and loosely
speaking, it allows participants to add new financial records to the authoritative
sequence by demonstrating that they have expended computing power on an oth-
erwise unimportant, repetitive task. This process, known as Bitcoin mining, con-
fers the right to add a record to the sequence (and also, not incidentally, it is
rewarded by the creation of new bitcoins, partly as an incentive to participate in
the network and partly as a way to manage the initial distribution of bitcoins). In
the event of a dispute among different candidate sequences of transactions, the
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Other DLT consensus models include “unique node list” consen-
sus53 and proof-of-stake consensus,54 among several others.55 “The
basic premise is that all nodes control each other all the time and they
can do that because they know exactly what every other node should
hold as truth at any given time. If all nodes agree, this is called con-
sensus.”56 In other words, “[e]very node in a blockchain stores and
computes the same data.”57 In Ethereum, for example, “every transac-
tion that was ever made, every contract that was ever invoked, is re-
lived by [each node].”58 This allows each node to ensure that “the data
it is receiving is consistent and double checks the global state of the
Ethereum network.”59 Ultimately, whatever specific form used, the
consensus mechanism and cryptographic signatures replace the tradi-
one that is eventually backed by the most computing power wins.” (footnotes
omitted)).
53. See DAVID SCHWARTZ, NOAH YOUNGS & ARTHUR BRITTO, THE RIPPLE PROTOCOL
CONSENSUS ALGORITHM 3 (2014), https://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_white
paper.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7XMM-7HNS]; Dave Cohen, David Schwartz &
Arthur Britto, The XRP Ledger Consensus Process, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/
build/ripple-ledger-consensus-process [https://perma.unl.edu/HDH7-CYWE]. In
the Ripple Protocol, the candidate set of transactions is validated and becomes
part of the permanent, authoritative ledger once the votes from the server nodes
reaches eighty percent. Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: Currency
Versus Trust-Less Transfer Technology 15 (OECD Working Papers on Fin., Ins. &
Private Pensions, Paper No. 37, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-mar
kets/The-Bitcoin-Question-2014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/LZ7M-EGHV]. At
least one commentator has referred to this approach as a “Byzantine agreement
system”; however, the creators of the Ripple Protocol do not themselves adopt
that terminology. See generally DAVID MAZIE`RES, THE STELLAR CONSENSUS PRO-
TOCOL: A FEDERATED MODEL FOR INTERNET-LEVEL CONSENSUS (2016), https://www
.stellar.org/papers/stellar-consensus-protocol.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7P6C-
NQLY].
54. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19, at 7 n.30; see also Nicolas Houy, It Will Cost
You Nothing to “Kill” a Proof-of-Stake Crypto-Currency, 34 ECON. BULL. 1038,
1040 (2014) (describing proof of stake as a consensus mechanism in which “the
expected reward for inserting transactions in the blockchain does not depend on
the computational power of miners but on the amount of crypto-currency they
already own”).
55. For example, the Stellar Consensus Protocol uses an approach similar to that of
Ripple, which it refers to as a “Federated Byzantine Agreement” consensus
model. MAZIE`RES, supra note 53. See also the discussion in IDDO BENTOV ET AL.,
PROOF OF ACTIVITY: EXTENDING BITCOIN’S PROOF OF WORK VIA PROOF OF STAKE
(2014), http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/452.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4JFL-UMGP]
(proposing a new proof-of-activity model by combining a proof-of-work component
with a proof-of-stake-type system).
56. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 20.
57. Id. at 33.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis omitted). Note that “state” refers to “all or part of the data that a
program deals with.” Id. Computer code that remembers things, then, is
“stateful” computer code. DLT in general, and Ethereum in particular, is for
stateful applications.
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tional third-party mediator as the entity maintaining the ledger, and
instead the system offers a peer-to-peer basis for trust, accountability,
and transparency.60
Richard Gendal Brown, the developer spearheading R3’s Corda™
distributed ledger for financial services, explains the foundation for
DLT’s peer-to-peer basis for trust another way. Brown views DLT as
offering a bundle of five services which include: (1) consensus, the ca-
pacity to “create a world where parties to a shared fact know that the
fact they see is the same as the fact that other stakeholders
see . . . across the Internet between mutually untrusting parties”;61 (2)
validity, the capacity “to know whether a given proposed update to the
system is valid”;62 (3) uniqueness, the capacity, in the face of conflict-
ing valid updates to the system, “to know which, if either, of those
updates we should select as the one we all agree on”;63 (4) immutabil-
ity,64 the feature of DLT whereby “nobody else [in the DLT system]
60. Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distrib-
uted Ledgers, IBM (May 9, 2016), http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/li
brary/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-bluemix-trs/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
9LUW-AR5E]. For example, in Ethereum, when you take the Ethereum consen-
sus mechanism and add the fact that “every single change to the global world
state of the Ethereum network has been signed off by the person owning the
sender account of the transaction effecting the change” with the result being an
outcome of the world state that is indisputable and trustworthy. DIEDRICH, supra
note 8, at 34–35.
61. Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed
for Financial Services, R3 POV (Apr. 5, 2016) (emphasis omitted), https://www
.r3cev.com/blog/2016/4/4/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-
financial-services [https://perma.unl.edu/L3EY-K6GN].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. As a note on terminology, when someone remarks that DLT is “permanent,” or
“immutable,” they are referring to the technology’s ability to track the complete
history and the current state of the protocol. This terminology is, however, very
simplistic for the complexity of the computer science and mathematical concepts
it tries to convey. With regard to the history of transactions in DLT,
All blockchains have a notion of a history—the set of all previous trans-
actions and blocks and the order in which they took place—and the
STATE—‘currently relevant’ data that determines whether or not a given
transaction is valid and what the state after processing a transaction
will be. Blockchain protocols also have a notion of A STATE TRANSITION
RULE: given what the state was before, and given a particular transac-
tion, (i) is the transaction valid, and (ii) what will the state be after the
transaction?
VITALIK BUTERIN, ETHEREUM: PLATFORM REVIEW (2015), https://static1.square
space.com/static/55f73743e4b051cfcc0b02cf/t/57506f387da24ff6bdecb3c1/1464889
147417/Ethereum_Paper.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2MFU-EFD6]. This under-
standing of transaction history is not always the same understanding lawyers
have when they hear or use the terms permanent or immutable, even in reference
to DLT. Where appropriate, I use the term “temper resistant” to more accurately
reflect to non-computer-scientist readers the use of the term immutable (or per-
manent) in this context.
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will accept a transaction from me if it tries to build on a modified ver-
sion of some data that has already been accepted by other stakehold-
ers”;65 and (5) authentication, the feature of DLT whereby “every
action in the system is almost always associated with a private key;
there is no concept of a ‘master key’ or ‘administrator password’ that
gives God-like powers.”66 Brown considers these five services capable
of unbundling and repackaging to serve specific design purposes.67
Therefore, DLT represents general-purpose technology that can be
used to solve any problem to which it is well suited.
B. A Brief Introduction to Smart Contracts
DLTs are also robust enough to allow software developers to layer
complex relationships into the computational material of the underly-
ing protocol. In 1994, Nick Szabo first conceptualized such coded rela-
tionships as “smart contracts,”68 which he defined as “a set of
promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which
the parties perform on these promises.”69 Although this term is now
frequently used when considering whether natural-language contracts
can be adequately translated into computer code or when referring to
computer programs that themselves represent a legally binding con-
tract, Szabo’s original conception was broad enough that while some
smart contracts may fulfill the legal requirements of the word “con-
tract,”70 some may not.71 At base, and in line with Szabo’s original
65. Brown, supra note 61 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. S. ASHARAF & S. ADARSH, DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING USING BLOCKCHAIN TECH-
NOLOGIES AND SMART CONTRACTS 45 (2017) (“The concept of smart contracts was
first formally coined by Nick Szabo in 1994.”).
69. NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR DIGITAL MARKETS (1996),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Litera
ture/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/AX4L-CPC5]; Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relation-
ships on the Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Szabo,
Formalizing and Securing Relationships], http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/
fm/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.unl.edu/V6JY-T7RE].
70. See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, CAN SMART CONTRACTS BE LEGALLY BINDING CON-
TRACTS? (2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright—
r3-smart-contracts-white-paper-key-findings-nov-2016-144554.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/963U-UX5A]; Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina,
67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
71. WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE AND APPLI-
CATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 42 (2016) (“Smart contracts are not
the same as a contractual agreement. If we stick to Nick Szabo’s original idea,
smart contracts help make the breach of an agreement expensive because they
control a real-world valuable property via ‘digital means.’ So, a smart contract
can enforce a functional implementation of a particular requirement, and can
show proof that certain conditions were met or not met.”).
2017] CONCEPTUALIZING CRYPTOLAW 397
idea, a smart contract is thus “a computer protocol—an algorithm—
that can self-execute, self-enforce, self-verify, and self-constrain the
performance” of its instructions.72 So conceived, the Bitcoin
blockchain is itself a limited form of a smart contract.73 Similarly, the
computer code that causes the Plantoid to dance upon receipt of
bitcoin is a smart contract.
More complex smart contracts can be created by embedding addi-
tional code into the underlying protocol;74 however, the level of com-
plexity achievable may be determined by the underlying protocol used.
For example, Ethereum is a DLT specifically designed to enhance de-
velopers’ ability to layer complex transaction protocols on top of the
base ledger75 and is thought to thereby enable more complex smart-
contract programming.76 One writer explains that Ethereum goes be-
yond the Bitcoin blockchain “and allows you to program the future, to
72. MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY 16 (2015) (“[A]
smart contract is both defined by the code and executed (or enforced) by the code,
automatically without discretion.”); TIM SWANSON, GREAT CHAIN OF NUMBERS: A
GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS, SMART PROPERTY, AND TRUSTLESS ASSET MANAGE-
MENT 16 (2014).
73. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 34, at 30 (“Distributed ledgers are active, not pas-
sive. In other words, they do not simply record information passed to them. They
are part of a consensus system, so they must ensure that recorded transactions
are actually completed to match the consensus. For Bitcoin, that means the sys-
tem self-enforces financial transfers. I can’t initiate a transaction promising to
send you Bitcoin and then renege; the synchronization that reconciles and com-
pletes the transfer is part of the process. This mechanism is known as a smart
contract. Both the specification of rights and obligations, and the execution of
that contractual agreement, occur through the platform.” (footnotes omitted)).
74. MOUGAYAR, supra note 71, at 43 (“Smart contracts are not the same as blockchain
applications. Smart contracts are usually part of a decentralized (blockchain) ap-
plication.”); SWAN, supra note 72, at 16 (“In the blockchain context, contracts or
smart contracts mean blockchain transactions that go beyond simple buy/sell cur-
rency transactions, and may have more extensive instructions embedded into
them.”); Werbach, supra note 34, at 30–31 (“Adding richer programming capabili-
ties to blockchain transactions adds security risks and various other complexi-
ties. On the other hand, a smart contract engine on the blockchain creates
enticing possibilities. In technical terms, smart contracts are essentially autono-
mous software agents. With smart contracts, a distributed ledger becomes func-
tionally a distributed computer.” (footnotes omitted)).
75. MOUGAYAR, supra note 71, at 43 (noting that Ethereum uses a specific smart-
contract language (Solidity), enabling coders to write complex processes in a
short span of code); Werbach, supra note 34, at 31 (“Newer blockchain platforms
remove Bitcoin’s limitations on smart contracts. The most prominent is Ether-
eum, which launched in 2015. Ethereum offers a Turing-complete programming
language, meaning that in theory, any application that runs on a conventional
computer can be executed on the distributed computer of its consensus network.
Ethereum is designed as a complete smart contract platform, including develop-
ment tools and a browser.” (footnotes omitted)).
76. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 39 (“Ethereum has its focus on smart contracts instead
of being exclusively a digital currency. And as part of that, Ethereum transac-
tions can be way more sophisticated than Bitcoin’s: full fledged, high language
398 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:384
implement rules governing the array of possibilities that fan out from
the present.”77
The potential uses for smart contracts are limited only by the cod-
ers that develop them. Although smart contracts “are ideal for inter-
acting with real world assets, smart property, Internet of Things (IoT),
and financial services instruments,” they need not be limited in appli-
cation to the movement of monetary value.78 Instead, smart contracts
“apply to almost anything that changes its state over time, and could
have a value attached to it.”79
The key elements that make smart contracts both unique and pow-
erful lie in their autonomous, self-sufficient, distributed nature. After
launching a smart contract, the contract runs autonomously in that
the developer does not need to actively maintain, monitor, or even be
in contact with it.80 The operating contract is self-sufficient insofar as
it may be programmed to “marshal resources—that is, raising funds
by providing service or issuing equity, and spending them on needed
resources, such as processing power or storage.”81 Finally, the smart
contract is distributed in that it exists as software distributed and op-
erated across a variety of network nodes.82 Further, each smart con-
tract “will be imbued with some modest form of ‘intelligence’,
statistical algorithms and optimizations.”83
These advanced qualities make smart contracts a technology tool
of general application. Current uses include the securities-trading
platform developed and launched by Overstock.com Inc.—the t0 plat-
form.84 Specifically, “Overstock.com Inc. . . . has issued bonds on the
bitcoin blockchain, becoming the first company to offer a crypto-secur-
ity, and has gained regulatory approval to do the same with equity.”85
Other examples include decentralized file storage86 and notary ser-
programs, some many thousand lines long, which can call each other, almost ad
infinitum.”).
77. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
78. MOUGAYAR, supra note 71, at 43.
79. Id.
80. SWAN, supra note 72, at 16.
81. Id. This autonomy and self-sufficiency is aptly demonstrated in current uses of
smart contracts. Take, for example, the Plantoid project described in the opening
paragraph of this Article. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. For more
information, see I’m a Plantoid: A Blockchain-Based Life Form, supra note 3.
82. SWAN, supra note 72, at 16.
83. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 83.
84. David Floyd, Overstock’s t0: Reconciling Fiat Currency and the Bitcoin
Blockchain, NASDAQ (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/overstocks-t0
-reconciling-fiat-currency-and-the-bitcoin-blockchain-cm555617 [https://perma
.unl.edu/H52Q-Q6NT].
85. Id.
86. SHAWN WILKINSON, STORJ: A PEER-TO-PEER CLOUD STORAGE NETWORK 2 (2014),
https://storj.io/storj2014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/LZ3U-5CBY] (outlining a pro-
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vices,87 among others.88 To date, the law’s main concern around smart
contracts focuses on determining whether and how the disruptive ap-
plications using smart contracts should be regulated. The law and
those that develop it, academics and policymakers alike, should pre-
pare for a time when smart contracts and DLT disrupt the law itself.
We should prepare for a jurisprudence of cryptolaw: a discussion
about law that anticipates new issues emerging as a result of us-
ing DLT and smart contracts in regulation, enforcement, and
adjudication.
III. DEFINING CRYPTOLAW
Vague references to an emerging law of DLT appear occasionally.89
When pressed to describe what makes the legal issues facing DLT dif-
ferent from other law-and-technology considerations, many argu-
ments harken back to the 1990s debate about regulation and the
Internet. Others point to what arguably represent cryptolaw’s precur-
sors.90 The cryptolaw conceptualized in this Article is not a discussion
of whether or how to regulate DLT91 nor is it a discussion of how new
technology can be used to comply with current law.92 Instead, this
Part conceptualizes cryptolaw as the new jurisprudence that will
emerge as a result of implementing and delivering the law of any sub-
ject matter through smart-contracting, semi-autonomous, intelligently
developing cryptographic computer code. This Part argues that a vari-
ety of laws and legal structures will benefit from the autonomous, self-
executing, transparent nature of DLT. By building such laws into
computer-coded legal structures (which this Article calls “crypto-legal
structures”), lawmakers will be able to emphasize the specific features
of DLT most useful to the legal and social problem at hand. As such
crypto-legal structures interact with each other and with those gov-
posal for a “decentralized cloud storage platform that implements end-to-end en-
cryption on a decentralized and open network”).
87. Luke Parker, Bitnation Starts Offering Blockchain Public Notary Service to Esto-
nian e-Residents, BRAVE NEW COIN (Dec. 1, 2015), http://bravenewcoin.com/news/
bitnation-starts-offering-blockchain-public-notary-service-to-estonian-e-residents
[https://perma.unl.edu/KY8S-M8NZ].
88. For a more complete discussion of potential and developing use cases, see DIE-
DRICH, supra note 8, at 58–69; see also SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE & DELOITTE,
SMART CONTRACTS: 12 USE CASES FOR BUSINESS & BEYOND (2016), http://www
.digitalchamber.org/smartcontracts.html (describing two cases for using smart
contracts).
89. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
90. Werbach, supra note 34, at 73–77 (describing a process for using DLT to supple-
ment existing laws).
91. See, e.g., Brito et al., supra note 20; De Filippi, supra note 20; Reyes, supra note
19; Tu & Meredith, supra note 20; Hewitt, supra note 20; Howden, supra note 20;
Rosner & Kang, supra note 20.
92. Werbach, supra note 34, at 73–78.
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erned by the law, a broader set of new legal principles and issues will
emerge as cryptolaw. Sections III.A. and III.B. help concretize this
new system by exploring cryptolaw in the context of two examples.
Finally, section III.C. concludes by arguing that, taken together,
crypto-legal structures and the related new legal constructs in crypto-
law thereby constitute a new theory or philosophy of law, thus demon-
strating that cryptolaw is more than another “law of the horse.”93
A. Distributed Ledger Technology Will Lead to Cryptolaw
The use of DLT and its smart-contracting capacity by governments
will lead to the emergence of cryptolaw: a new legal discourse antici-
pating the issues arising from implementing, enforcing, and adjudicat-
ing law through smart-contracting, semi-autonomous cryptographic
computer code. I advanced an initial framework for implementing and
delivering law through cryptographic, smart-contracting computer
code in a prior article,94 where I argued that regulation implemented
and delivered through code solves the riddle of how to regulate DLT
and its many use cases without stifling innovation. This Article ex-
pands on that base by arguing that the endogenous theory previously
proposed can be applied to any substantive area of law to create
crypto-legal structures. The Article goes on to explore the doctrinal
and jurisprudential ramifications of crypto-legal structures, offering a
conceptual framework for cryptolaw—a new area of legal discourse.
Conceptualizing cryptolaw requires envisioning a world in which
law is created first through legislation or regulation written in words
and then implemented through cryptographic, smart-contracting com-
puter code.95 The creation and implementation of any individual ele-
ment of cryptolaw (which this Article refers to as a crypto-legal
structure) may occur in a variety of ways, each varying in its degree of
endogenous origins, jurisdictional application, and the degree to which
its implementation relies entirely upon DLT, or on a mix of DLT and
existing legal structures. The ability to rapidly tailor the method and
locus of creating crypto-legal structures to the need of the legal or pol-
icy problem represents one of its core beneficially disruptive elements.
Furthermore, recognizing that DLT offers a diverse array of architec-
ture to choose from addresses a frequent objection that certain indus-
93. The “law of the horse” is a term Frank Easterbrook coined in reference to the law
of cyberspace, quipping that the law of cyberspace is merely a specialized en-
deavor to which general legal rules could be applied as problems arose on a case-
by-case basis, rather than a separate area of law. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyber-
space and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–208. For a more
detailed discussion of the “law of the horse,” see infra notes 150–55 and accompa-
nying text.
94. Reyes, supra note 19.
95. Id. at 228.
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try actors, governments, and academics seek to apply DLT in
inappropriate contexts simply because DLT is the hot technology inno-
vation of the day.
Specifically, some argue that the recent hype around DLT is lead-
ing to its use in areas where DLT is not necessary96 and that doing so
can lead to unnecessary design flaws in key structures.97 Under this
line of thinking, new technology, including DLT, should only be ap-
plied to circumstances in which the technology offers the right solu-
tion to a specific problem.98 Under what circumstances, then, will it be
appropriate to apply DLT to the law? In many areas, law adapts
slowly to current realities and new technologies, stifling innovation.99
In other areas, the law requires a clear record or evidence that in prac-
tice is very difficult to obtain in a verifiable way.100 In yet other areas,
regulatory complexity or uncertainty paralyzes individuals or busi-
ness entities and prevents them from acting.101 In conceptualizing the
broader ramifications of crypto-legal structures (some of which are be-
ing created by governments right now)102 on the law, this Article asks
whether and under what circumstances DLT is the appropriate mech-
anism for addressing these problems of law lag, inefficiency, usability,
and transparency.
Many coders, such as R3’s Richard Gendal Brown, view DLT as a
bundle of five services (consensus, validity, uniqueness, immutability,
and authentication)103 that can be selected, like items on a menu, in
whatever combination is needed to address a problem.104 Taken to-
gether, these five services of DLT lead to “the emergence of platforms,
shared across the Internet between mutually distrusting actors, that
96. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 49–50 (demonstrating that many current proposals for
blockchain-based applications are really database, cloud-service, or cryptogra-
phy-based applications instead).
97. Brown, supra note 61.
98. Id.
99. Jeremy Pitt & Ada Diaconescu, The Algorithmic Governance of Common-Pool Re-
sources, in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDEN-
TITY AND AUTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY 130, 137–38 (John H. Clippinger &
David Bollier eds., 2014).
100. For example, consider the U.C.C. Article 9 Filing System. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI,
ELIZABETH WARREN & ROBERT LAWLESS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS AP-
PROACH 281–82 (8th ed. 2016) (“[F]iling systems are highly imprecise and difficult
and expensive to use. Filing is relatively easy. But searching is relatively
difficult . . . .”).
101. For example, consider the application of federal and state money-transmission
laws to the financial-technology (“FinTech”) industry. The laws applicable to the
money-transmission context exist at both the state and federal levels, and viola-
tions are punishable by criminal penalties, including prison. Elizabeth Pollman
& Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017).
102. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
103. For a full discussion of each service, see supra text accompanying notes 61–66.
104. Brown, supra note 61.
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allow them to reach consensus about the existence and evolution of
facts shared between them.”105 To determine, then, whether a partic-
ular area of the law will benefit from the application of DLT, we must
consider whether the root of the identified problem of law lag, ineffi-
ciency, usability, or transparency relates to difficulty in reaching a
consensus about the existence and evolution of shared facts. If so, that
area of the law is ripe for crypto-legal-structure development. In such
circumstances, the goal is to choose from the menu of DLT services to
implement the law through smart-contracting distributed computer
code in a way that addresses the identified problem.106 When con-
ceived of in this light, crypto-legal structures represent a general-pur-
pose form of implementing and adjudicating law. Crypto-legal
structures are not limited by the context in which they are applied
because the DLT underlying the structures can be unbundled and re-
packaged to address any specific context.
To concretize this idea, consider the implications of a shared record
of immutable, verifiable, unique, authenticated facts for the Uniform
Commercial Code’s Article 9 filing system. Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) governs security interests in personal prop-
erty.107 Protection of a secured creditor’s interest in the collateral
used to secure the loan it made vis-a`-vis the interests of other secured
creditors depends, in part, upon the ability of a secured creditor to
communicate the existence of its interest to other potential credi-
tors.108 To this end, U.C.C. Article 9 includes a filing system for use in
“communicating the existence of a lien from the holder to a person
who is considering becoming a creditor of the same debtor.”109 The
goal of the filing system is to give prospective creditors actual knowl-
edge of preexisting liens.110 Unfortunately, “filing systems are highly
imprecise and difficult and expensive to use,” particularly for those
searching the system for evidence of preexisting liens.111 The expense
and difficulty of using such filing systems stem, at least in part, from
the fact that: (1) there is not just one filing system, but many;112 (2)
“search methods differ widely from one filing system to another”;113
105. Id.
106. When considered in the context of this broader theory, my prior proposal to use
DLT to regulate DLT was a proposal for a crypto-legal structure, which, when
taken together with other crypto-legal structures created across any other num-
ber of substantive disciplines, will create a new legal discourse of cryptolaw.
107. U.C.C. § 9-109, reprinted in CAROL L. CHOMSKY ET AL., SELECTED COMMERCIAL
STATUTES 737–43 (2016).
108. Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on
Building the Electronic Highway, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1992).
109. LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at 281.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 281–82.
112. Id. at 283.
113. Id. at 294.
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(3) searches cannot be conducted on the full text of the filings, but
rather, only on the index of the filing, which itself is limited to a single
piece of information—the debtor’s name;114 (4) filings in the system
remain effective even after the name of the debtor listed on the filing
has changed or the corporate debtor has undergone a structural
change;115 and (5) following the rules of lapse and continuation to en-
sure a security interest is not lost remains complicated.116 In terms of
the DLT services bundle, the common element among these five
problems with the Article 9 filing system is that the parties using the
system can never be certain that the facts that they are looking at are
the same facts that the other parties in the system see. In other words,
the system regularly fails to reach a consensus about the existence
and evolution of shared facts. This makes the U.C.C. Article 9 filing
system ripe for reform using crypto-legal structures that balance the
proportion of the five DLT services—consensus, validity, uniqueness,
immutability, and authentication—in ways that serve the unique
goals of the filing system. For example, although the Article 9 filing
system would likely benefit from the full robustness of consensus as
public DLT systems, perhaps only the debtor, secured creditor, and
the filing office need to validate the financing statements that pertain
to specific transactions, rather than all the users of the crypto-legal
structure (as would be the baseline for permissionless DLT).
Another area of the law that similarly appears to be ripe for the
application of DLT, albeit to address a different problem in the law, is
the anti-money laundering (AML) regulations implemented pursuant
to the federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).117 The BSA and its implement-
ing regulations (the BSA Regulations) are enforced by the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the
Treasury (FinCEN).118 The BSA Regulations, an AML regime, require
covered entities to know their customers and report transactions that
114. Id. at 295. I recognize that this is only an introductory list of the failings of the
Article 9 filing system. A full list is beyond the scope of this Article and has been
considered extensively by the literature and cases on Article 9. For a summary of
those literature and cases, see LoPucki, supra note 108, at 6–15.
115. LoPucki, supra note 108, at 23.
116. Id. at 24.
117. In fact, the Directorate General of Financial Stability, Financial Services, and
Capital Markets Union (FISMA) of the European Commission appears to concur,
as it is conducting a feasibility study of whether blockchain technology can lower
compliance obligations for financial institutions. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 65.
118. Bank Secrecy Act tits. I–II, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114–24 (1970)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–14,
5316–32 (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations
requiring organizations falling within the definition of “financial institutions” to
keep records and file certain reports).
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are either suspicious or surpass a certain volume threshold.119 As part
of the AML structure, the Funds Transfer120 and Funds Travel121
rules require covered entities to pass certain information about the
parties involved in a transmittal of funds to the receiving institution
together with the funds transferred during the transaction.122
To comply with the BSA Regulations, covered entities register with
FinCEN and implement business-specific controls designed to flag
suspicious transactions and then report flagged transactions to
FinCEN on the prescribed forms.123 This AML system suffers from at
least two major flaws: (1) even a diligent company may not red flag all
transactions that qualify for reporting under the BSA Regulations,
and (2) regular enforcement by FinCEN takes place through onsite
inspections of books and records on an infrequent basis unless an en-
tity is deemed such a risk that it should be investigated extensively
and prosecuted for the crime of failing to comply with the BSA Regula-
tions.124 At the root of these problems lies an inability to automati-
cally identify the shared facts of interest that trigger compliance
obligations. In other words, the system regularly fails to reach a con-
sensus about the existence and evolution of shared facts. This makes
BSA Regulation compliance a legal area ripe for the application of
crypto-legal structures.
Thus far, then, cryptolaw can be conceptualized as a new area of
legal discourse used to identify when crypto-legal structures should be
adopted to address situations where the law struggles to provide a
suitable mechanism for actors to reach a consensus about the exis-
tence and evolution of shared facts. Each crypto-legal structure repre-
sents law implemented and delivered through DLT-based computer
code. The next step in conceptualizing cryptolaw is identifying the
method or methods by which crypto-legal structures will be adopted.
119. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.620 (2013) (requiring covered financial intuitions to create
know-your-customer, or due diligence, programs); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.310 (2013)
(reporting currency transactions over ten thousand dollars); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320
(2013) (reporting suspicious transactions).
120. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(e) (2013).
121. § 1010.410(f).
122. See generally FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINCEN
ADVISORY: FUNDS TRANSFERS (1996), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/
aml2007/fincen-advsiii.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/W35R-SAVK].
123. For registration and renewal requirements, see 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012) and 31
C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2013). For requirements concerning the development and exe-
cution of an AML program that implements reporting obligations, see 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(a)(2) (2012) and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2013).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) (requiring an independent review to “test, monitor and
maintain, its anti-money laundering program” without further details). The fre-
quency and extent of the review is determined in accordance with the MSB’s risk-
assessment profile. Id.
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B. Three Possible Methods of Adopting Crypto-Legal
Structures
There are three ways in which crypto-legal structures seem likely
to emerge: (1) through industry-constructed crypto-legal structures
later adopted by government actors, (2) through crypto-legal struc-
tures directly coded and adopted by government actors, and (3)
through international development of crypto-legal structures.125 Fur-
thermore, more than one single crypto-legal structure could be created
to deal with a specific problem to more endogenously meet the needs of
the governed. For example, in the context of compliance with the BSA
Regulations, the crypto-legal structures useful for large, federally
chartered banks are likely to look different from those useful to small
FinTech companies that often prefer to incorporate elements of
permissionless DLT into their business models. The crypto-legal
structures would work together and in tandem, and could call to each
other, leading to the development of more complex, nimble, and re-
sponsive crypto-legal structures over time. More fully understanding
the importance and likelihood of each of the possible pathways for
adopting crypto-legal structures calls for a closer examination of each
in the context of one or both of the real-world legal examples set forth
above.
1. Government Adoption of Industry-Created Crypto-Legal
Structures
Crypto-legal structures might be constructed voluntarily by the
business community relying upon DLT when the community identifies
an opportunity to endogenously implement cryptolaw at the level of
permissionless DLT protocols.126 For example, the Bitcoin blockchain
core developers have already undertaken a version of this process for
certain legal rules of particular concern to the community: AML com-
pliance under the BSA. In the summer of 2016, the Bitcoin blockchain
core developers released BIP 75, a technical standard for use in con-
nection with payments applications running on the Bitcoin
blockchain.127 BIP 75 both enables businesses to offer a more user-
125. In each case, the government agency would adopt the crypto-legal structure ei-
ther by issuing guidance interpreting the crypto-legal structure as complying
with existing requirements or by issuing code or proof-of-concept as part of a
rulemaking process subject to a public notice-and-comment period.
126. Reyes, supra note 19, at 230–31.
127. See Kyle Torpey, BIP 75 Simplifies Bitcoin Wallets for the Everyday User,
BITCOIN MAG. (Apr. 23, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bip-simplifies-
bitcoin-wallets-for-the-everyday-user-1461856604 [https://perma.unl.edu/F5MC-
BNU3].
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friendly interface and comply with certain anti-money-laundering
laws overseen by FinCEN.128
One of the key authors of BIP 75, Justin Newton, described the
protocol as an opportunity to accept the fact that AML and know-your-
customer rules apply to certain bitcoin payments applications, while
creating a compliance mechanism that “protects fungibility, privacy
and the open, permissionless nature of Bitcoin.”129 Newton went on to
affirm the primary benefits of creating such crypto-legal structures,
namely, making them endogenous in nature, saying, “In the absence
of a standard that encourages those values, we will end up with hid-
den systems that do exactly the same thing, but without taking the
concerns of the community into account.”130 BIP 75 is an example of
an endogenously created crypto-legal structure.131 To graft BIP 75
into an emerging body of cryptolaw, FinCEN could adopt a regulation
providing that companies applying BIP 75 to their payments services
will be deemed compliant with certain anti-money-laundering rules if,
128. Id. BIP 75 is referred to colloquially as “the Payment Protocol” and “creates a
method of communication between a merchant and their customers before a pay-
ment is made.” Id. The benefit of this communication mechanism is that it “al-
lows customers to see human-readable payment destinations, which can be
authenticated via digital signatures.” Id. It also “creates a proof-of payment for
the customer” and enables a refund mechanism. Id. These are all elements of BIP
75 that make bitcoin transactions more user-friendly. BIP 75 also “make[s] it
easier for companies (financial in nature or not) to collect data on their custom-
ers.” Kyle Torpey, Does BIP 75 Really Threaten Bitcoin’s Fungibility?, BITCOIN
MAG. (June 30, 2016) [hereinafter Torpey, BIP 75 and Fungibility], https://bitcoin
magazine.com/articles/does-bip-really-threaten-bitcoin-s-fungibility-1467302909
[https://perma.unl.edu/7HTS-BAQA]. Such data collection will enable compliance
with such anti-money-laundering rules as the Funds Transfer and Funds Travel
Rules administered by FinCEN, which require financial institutions to transfer
data between them relating to the senders and receivers of funds transfers. 31
C.F.R. § 1010.410(e)–(f) (2013).
129. Torpey, BIP 75 and Fungibility, supra note 128 (quoting Justin Newton).
130. Id. (quoting Justin Newton).
131. Other voluntary organizations formed by the DLT industry are also working to
create technical standards that could be adopted as crypto-legal structures by the
appropriate regulatory authority. For example, the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) is considering whether to design technical standards for the compatibility
of DLT and web applications. W3C, BLOCKCHAINS AND THE WEB REPORT (2016),
https://www.w3.org/2016/04/blockchain-workshop/report.html [https://perma.unl
.edu/DTK3-LKKQ]. Further, the Chamber of Digital Commerce established the
Blockchain Alliance, a forum for promoting collaboration between law enforce-
ment and the blockchain community to build standards for cooperation and in-
vestigation. Blockchain Alliance, CHAMBER DIGITAL COM., http://digitalchamber
.org/blockchain-alliance.html [https://perma.unl.edu/GW49-LEQN]. In addition,
the Coalition of Automated Legal Applications serves as the Internet Governance
Forum’s Dynamic Coalition for the governance of blockchain technologies.
COALA, DYNAMIC COALITION ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2016), https://
www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/index.php?q=filedepot_download/4189/125
[https://perma.unl.edu/4Z7M-VGDQ].
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for example, the companies submit to a technical audit process not
less than two times per calendar year. To do so, FinCEN would engage
in a rule-making process, subject to a public notice-and-comment pe-
riod. Alternatively, FinCEN might issue administrative guidance in-
terpreting BIP 75 as a program feature that complies with certain
elements of the BSA Regulations. The possibility of industry-devel-
oped crypto-legal structures enables new forms of regulatory entrepre-
neurship132 and thereby offers an organic process for narrowing the
gap between law and technology.
2. Crypto-Legal Structures Directly Coded by Government
The proliferation of permissioned ledgers, and the admitted reti-
cence of the core DLT developers to endogenously adopt standards
such as BIP 75,133 ensures the importance of the second method for
creating and implementing crypto-legal structures: government crea-
tion of crypto-legal structures. In this second method, the relevant
government agency, employing their own in-house software develop-
ers, will design the crypto-legal structure, issue it as a regulation
through the public rule-making process, or declare it compliant by in-
terpreting existing regulations in administrative guidance. In the con-
text of large federally regulated financial institutions’ compliance with
the BSA Regulations, this type of crypto-legal structure may be more
useful than BIP 75. Further, it builds on a trend with which such in-
stitutions are already familiar; namely, RegTech, the process of trying
to automate BSA compliance with technology that prefills and files
the required FinCEN forms when algorithms spot certain red flags.134
A crypto-legal structure for BSA Regulations would merely be the next
step in technological evolution for efficient and accurate implementa-
tion of the law, with the advantages of increased efficiency gains, de-
creased costs of enforcement, and decreased false positives over its
predecessor RegTech solutions. For example, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services is exploring the use of blockchain for
132. Pollman & Barry, supra note 101, at 384–85 (defining regulatory entrepreneur-
ship as a class of business activity in which a company “makes changing the law a
material part of its business plan” because its financial success depends “on the
resolution of legal issues concerning a core aspect of [its] business”).
133. Torpey, BIP 75 and Fungibility, supra note 128 (“BIP 75 institutionalizes [regu-
latory compliance] in a convenient way that everyone can easily use and expect.
We should comply with AML [and] KYC [regulations] only grudgingly.” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting lead Blockchain developer Peter Todd)).
134. DELOITTE, REGTECH IS THE NEW FINTECH: HOW AGILE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY
IS HELPING FIRMS BETTER UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THEIR RISKS (2016), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/FinancialServices/IE_20
16_FS_RegTech_is_the_new_FinTech.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KQH5-3BED].
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managing health data,135 and the European Union is considering
blockchain for financial regulation.136
Crypto-legal structures coded directly by the relevant regulatory
agency would also be useful in the context of improving legal struc-
tures that depend upon a filing system of some kind, such as the
U.C.C. Article 9 example discussed above, among others.137 In fact, a
variety of regulatory agencies and legislative bodies already recognize
potential uses for such crypto-legal structures.138 Using crypto-legal
structures in this context would increase efficiencies, decrease trans-
action costs, and decrease problems related to the exchange of asym-
metrical information. Using a crypto-legal structure in Article 9 and
similar contexts also offers the added benefit of enabling regulators to
continue to require compliance with jurisdiction-specific rules while
also maintaining a national (or international) filing system without
significantly increasing regulatory burden. This possibility is ensured
by the fact that as long as the crypto-legal structures comply with a
minimum and uniform standard for interoperability and compatibil-
ity, the crypto-legal structures could be designed to interact with each
other across borders and across systems.
3. International Development of Crypto-Legal Structures
The concern for interoperability and compatibility of the various
crypto-legal structures that will emerge leads to a third process for
their creation and implementation: international standard setting.
This process would perhaps evidence characteristics directly opposite
135. Bradley, supra note 13; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
ONC Announces Blockchain Challenge Winners (Sept. 1, 2016), https://wayback
.archive-it.org/3926/20170127190114/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/08/2
9/onc-announces-blockchain-challenge-winners.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JUF
7-5V45].
136. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 19.
137. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text for a U.C.C. Article 9 example.
For another example of a solution that is bein.g developed by IBM, see
developerWorks TV, IBM Blockchain Car Lease Demo, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgNfoQQ5Reg.
138. See, e.g., del Castillo, supra note 12; Stan Higgins, Vermont Is Close to Passing a
Law that Would Make Blockchain Records Admissible in Court, COINDESK (May
17, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/vermont-blockchain-timestamps-approval
[https://perma.unl.edu/M2U4-7L68]; Giulio Prisco, Delaware Blockchain Initia-
tive to Streamline Record-Keeping for Private Companies, BITCOIN MAG. (May 9,
2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/delaware-blockchain-initiative-to-
streamline-record-keeping-for-private-companies-1462812187 [https://perma.unl
.edu/8YP4-KDS6]; Rizzo, supra note 11; Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Dela-
ware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Cor-
porate Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16,
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative
-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance [https://per
ma.unl.edu/TF6D-6E3A].
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to that of crypto-legal structures created by DLT core developers in
that it will be slow and bureaucratic. The reality is, however, that as a
technology with global reach, crypto-legal structures may emerge in-
ternationally as a preferred form of legal implementation and adjudi-
cation, and in such a scenario, only international cooperation will
ensure that industry is not trapped in a clash of crypto-legal struc-
tures which would render them unable to operate without redesigning
the code underlying their service in each jurisdiction.
Tellingly, the initial steps in this process are already underway. In
April 2016, Australia’s national standard-setting body proposed that
the International Standards Organization (ISO) create a new field of
technical activity to develop the “[s]tandardi[z]ation of blockchains
and distributed ledger technologies to support interoperability and
data interchange among users, applications and systems.”139 Al-
though the field of activity will specifically exclude “legal obligations
and regulatory matters addressed by government jurisdictions,” one of
the work’s articulated goals is to assure interoperability and compati-
bility across DLT and across jurisdictions such that individual juris-
dictions may “work towards a regulatory framework that provides a
mix of legal and technical rules.”140 In other words, the stated aim of
the ISO process is to pave the way for national jurisdictions to begin
implementing crypto-legal structures for their individual
jurisdictions.
Over time, other areas of the law that would benefit from a shared
record of tamper-resistant, verifiable, and authenticated facts will be-
come evident. As crypto-legal structures develop to address those
problems, the crypto-legal structures may be designed to interact with
each other, to interact with private contracting parties,141 or to inter-
act with the governed without a government intermediary. As smart-
contract coding capacity increases, we can imagine more complex
crypto-legal structures with more autonomous and self-executing fea-
tures. Crypto-legal structures might be supplemented by other tech-
nology, such as predictive technology142 or data-mining technology,143
139. STANDARDS AUSTL., ISO, FORM 1: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FIELD OF TECHNICAL AC-
TIVITY (2016), https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/News%20and%20Pub
lications/Links%20Within%20Stories/ISO%20TSP%20258%20%28Blockchain%
20and%20Electronic%20Distributed%20Ledger%20Technologies%29.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/G6RU-GPL4].
140. Id.
141. This potential becomes particularly interesting if a private law of lex
cryptographia emerges amongst peer-to-peer merchants acting over DLT, as sug-
gested by Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi. Wright & De Filippi, supra
note 19. Under such circumstances, cryptolaw may enable fluid transitions and
interactions between public and private law that have not previously been possi-
ble (or at least have been impossible to document to date).
142. For a discussion of the implications of predictive technology for the law generally,
see Casey & Niblett, supra note 16. And for a discussion of the implications of
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such that the smart contracts are able take on predictive qualities and
decisional capabilities. As the number of crypto-legal structures, the
frequency of their interactions with each other, and the complexity of
their designs increase, cryptolaw, the study of and discourse regarding
these interactions and complexities, begins to crystalize into a sepa-
rate and increasingly important area of law. A legal system in which
crypto-legal structures begin to take root will see fundamental
changes in the way the governed—whether individuals or entities—
experience, understand, and relate to the law.
C. More than Just Another “Law of the Horse”
Conceived of as the study of and discourse regarding interlinked
legal structures represented by self-executing, smart-contracting,
semi-autonomous, cryptographic computer code, the cryptolaw pro-
posed here represents something fundamentally different from the
way that term has been sparingly and tentatively used to date.144 At
present, most discussions about an emerging and evolving law of DLT
mostly revolve around whether new, improved, or different regulation
is required by the cryptographic nature of DLT.145 Such discussions
predictive technology in the credit-score context specifically, see Citron & Pas-
quale, supra note 17.
143. For a discussion of the possible implications of data-mining technology for the
law, see Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 15.
144. The most similar use of the term to date is by one of the chief developers of the
Ethereum protocol, Gavin Wood, who explained:
Around the 1990s it became clear that algorithmic enforcement of agree-
ments could become a significant force in human cooperation. Though no
specific system was proposed to implement such a system, it was pro-
posed that the future of law would be heavily affected by such systems.
In this light, Ethereum may be seen as a general implementation of such
a crypto-law system.
GAVIN WOOD, ETHEREUM: A SECURE DECENTRALISED GENERALISED TRANSACTION
LEDGER 2, http://gavwood.com/Paper.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7N3T-7SER].
However, Dr. Wood’s conception of cryptolaw stems from an entirely code-based
perspective and does not tie the use of code in Ethereum to the existing legal
system. In other words, Dr. Wood’s article is an attempt to fill the gap left by the
fact that “no specific system was proposed to implement” cryptolaw by either Dr.
Wood or his predecessor Nick Szabo. Id. Other references to “crypto law” really
intend to refer to the law governing encryption technologies, usually with refer-
ence to export controls relating to cryptography. See, e.g., BERT-JAAP KOOPS,
CRYPTO LAW SURVEY (1995), http://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/doc/cryptography/
Crypto_Law_Survey/CryptoLawSurvey.html [https://perma.unl.edu/8TKA-
YJNV] (reporting a “survey of cryptography laws”). For a good primer on the laws
governing cryptography, see Nathan Saper, Note, International Cryptography
Regulation and the Global Information Economy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 673 (2013). A few members of the DLT community refer to crypto law to
refrence “legal issues in cryptocurrency.” See, e.g., CRYPTO LAW BLOG, https://
cryptolawblog.wordpress.com [https://perma.unl.edu/3H3E-69GU].
145. I would include my own initial consideration of the subject in this category. As I
argued there, Reyes, supra note 19, these conversations are an important initial
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do not actually contemplate the emergence of new legal structures us-
ing DLT. Furthermore, such discourse has led to accusations that
cryptolaw is no more than a cyberlaw redux because it mirrors discus-
sion of cyberlaw in the early Internet days, in which the debate fo-
cused on who and how to regulate the Internet.146 Cyberlaw is largely
viewed today as an area of law for which there is “no unanimity” and
for which “a list of issues substitutes for an abstract definition.”147
Today, the term “cyberlaw” is synonymous with “the area of Internet
regulation.”148 In other words, “the vast majority of cyberlaw analysis
focuses on the application of existing legal norms—intellectual prop-
erty, trademark, antitrust, content regulation and the like—to cyber-
space issues.”149 As such, cyberlaw has been compared to “the law of
the horse.”150 Judge Frank Easterbrook saw activity in cyberspace,
like the ownership and management of horses, as a specialized en-
deavor to which general legal rules could be applied as problems arose
on a case-by-case basis.151 As a result, Easterbrook argued that “[a]ny
effort to collect these strands into a course on ‘The Law of the Horse,’”
or a law of cyberspace, “is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying
principles.”152
Several commentators prominently countered that cyberlaw could
avoid its apparent fate as the law of the horse by focusing on the ele-
step to enable those using the technology in business models at present the regu-
latory certainty required to operate while innovating. The argument here is that
while that discussion remains an important first step, the conversation should
not, and need not, end with consideration of how to regulate DLT. Id.
146. Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of In-
ternet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605, 606–07 (2003).
147. Id. at 606 n.1.
148. Id. at 606.
149. Id. at 608; see Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1147–49 (2000); see also Needham J. Boddie, II et al., A Review of Copyright
and the Internet, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 193, 193–94 (1998) (“The expansion of the
Internet in size, usage and influence has generated a variety of novel legal ques-
tions. . . . [Nonetheless,] ‘Internet Law’ does not represent a new field or body of
law such as tort law, contract law or property law. Internet Law is more or less
the application of existing legal doctrines to the new technologies, avenues of
commerce, and means of human interaction defined, created and experienced on
the Internet.”); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379–1400 (1996) (prescribing appli-
cation of distinct laws to cyberspace); Allison Roarty, Link Liability: The Argu-
ment for Inline Links and Frames as Infringements of the Copyright Display
Right, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1999) (“As the Internet continues to ex-
pand exponentially, so do the corresponding legal issues.”); Steven R. Salbu, Who
Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 430 (1998) (reviewing the many different cyberlaw is-
sues that have received significant attention).
150. Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 207–08.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 207.
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ments that make cyberspace unique: the concept of cyber-structure, or
“the indirect regulation of cyberspace through technological standards
and structures.”153 Most prominently, Professor Lawrence Lessig ar-
gued that examining the interaction between law and cyberspace
teaches “about the limits on law as a regulator and about the tech-
niques for escaping those limits” and requires a close look at “the col-
lection of tools that a society has at hand for affecting constraints
upon behavior.”154 Lessig concluded that, with the emergence of
cyberspace, a new regulatory force emerged—the computer code that
makes interaction in cyberspace possible.155 Tying cryptolaw to this
literature reveals that, to prevent cryptolaw from being summarily
dismissed as another law of the horse, discussion of cryptolaw cannot
end with whether and how to regulate DLT. If the discussion ends
there, cryptolaw will devolve into a group of loosely affiliated musings
about how to adapt legal paradigms built on assumptions of trusted
and regulateable intermediaries to the world of DLT, which relies on
math and inherently distrusts intermediaries.156 Instead, this Article
153. Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra note 146, at 608–09.
154. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, The Law of the Horse].
155. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) [hereinafter
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE I] (“That regulator is the obscurity in the book’s title—
Code. . . . In cyberspace we must understand how code regulates—how the
software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it
is. As William Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s ‘law.’ Code is law.” (foot-
note omitted)); Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note 154, at 549 (“[M]ore than
law alone enables legal values, and law alone cannot guarantee them. If our ob-
jective is a world constituted by these values, then it is as much these other regu-
lators—code, but also norms and the market—that must be addressed.”).
156. The comparison between the current literature on DLT and much of the cyberlaw
literature is not unwarranted. The cyber-governance discussions regarding
whether and how to regulate the Internet centered around four typical positions,
Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra note 146, at 612 (outlining three of the positions), each
of which has a counterpart in the DLT-governance literature prevalent to date.
The first position, which one commentator named the state-based traditionalists,
argued that the nation-state has the authority to regulate cyberspace in the same
manner that it has the authority to regulate any other space. Id. at 612–18. The
DLT-governance version of the state-based traditionalist position grounds itself
in real-life events and argues that the state, by regulating applications running
on DLT, is effectively regulating DLT in the same manner that it regulates any
other space. See, e.g., Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are
Bitcoins the Future?, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 272, 279 (2013) (arguing
that “Bitcoins are a form of intangible private property, a valuable digital arte-
fact” and are therefore “analogous with other forms of intangible private prop-
erty, such as digital music, shares, licenses, trademarks, copyright, goodwill,
domain names, frequent flier points and brands”); J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting
Out the White Horse: How the S.E.C. Can Handle Bitcoin’s Threat to American
Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 38 (2014); Nelson DaCunha, Virtual Property,
Real Concerns, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 41 (2010) (noting that if decentral-
ized virtual currencies are a form of intangible property, tort law offers one way
to protect interests of both users and service providers); Ruoke Yang, When Is
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demonstrates that cryptolaw is properly conceived of as a new way of
thinking, studying, and talking about the law that anticipates the new
issues arising from implementing law through cryptographic, smart-
contracting computer code with the capacity for self-execution, embed-
ded predictive technology, and autonomous interaction. As such,
cryptolaw is much more than just another law of the horse.
As was true of Professor Lessig’s focus on cyber-structures (e.g.,
the code), when the true focus of cryptolaw lies in DLT’s unique capac-
ity for creating new crypto-legal structures, cryptolaw disrupts the
way we currently think about the law and regulation. Specifically,
DLT has the potential to take the cyberstructural elements of
cyberlaw and pursue them to an extreme version of code as law
through crypto-legal structures. In other words, DLT offers
lawmakers the capacity to actually write law into computer code, em-
bed smart contracts to make the code self-executing, and embed predi-
cative and machine-learning technology to enable the law to learn and
adapt as it executes. DLT thereby offers an opportunity to resolve
some of the very objections Easterbrook originally made to the idea of
a law of cyberspace: crypto-legal structures allow the law, written into
Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 108
(2013). The second position, dubbed the cyber separatists, advocated that no reg-
ulation be imposed and that cyberspace be left to self-regulation. Mayer-
Scho¨nberger, supra note 146, at 618–26. A variety of DLT researchers and indus-
try actors similarly plead for regulatory caution, arguing that self-regulation
would be better poised to encourage innovation when DLT is still so new and
unknown. See, e.g., Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19. The third cyber-govern-
ance position, referred to as the internationalists, claimed that in light of the
international nature of the technology, governance would only be appropriate at
an international level through international law. Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra note
146, at 626–30. The international, borderless, inherently decentralized nature of
DLT has also given rise to arguments that only international bodies should have
the authority to dictate DLT-governance structures. See e.g., Nicholas Plassaras,
Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of
the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377 (2013). The fourth position, offered as an alterna-
tive to each of the other three, argued that a layered architectural approach was
more appropriate and encouraged lawmakers to layer regulation in ways that
took advantage of the uniqueness of the technology. Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra
note 146, at 637–40. Similarly, alternative regulatory approaches, rooted in the
layers and architectural principles developed in the Internet context, have been
suggested for use in DLT governance. Daniel Folkinshteyn, Mark M. Lennon &
Timothy Reilly, A Tale of Twin Tech: Bitcoin and the WWW, 10 J. STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD. 82 (2015). Both the cyber-governance debate and the DLT-governance
debate center on how current law can and should be applied to the emerging
technology of the time, arguably allowing the current DLT literature to fall victim
to the law-of-the-horse critique. As this Article has demonstrated, however,
cryptolaw possesses the potential to move beyond the DLT-governance debate to
a consideration of the potential impact of the technology at issue on the very
foundations of law and how society understands law.
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ever-adapting code,157 to endogenously keep pace with rapidly devel-
oping changes in technology.158 Ultimately then, DLT offers more
than merely emerging technology that poses new and interesting legal
questions, but rather, it offers a technology that can be employed to
form an entirely new discourse on the law—cryptolaw.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING CRYPTOLAW AS DISRUPTIVE
LEGAL DISCOURSE
Implementing crypto-legal structures will disrupt national legal
systems at their core, disrupting the very way we study, think, and
talk about the law. The core affected elements include legal structure,
substantive law, and legal culture.159 Crypto-legal structures will dis-
rupt each of these elements, causing fundamental change to any legal
system in which they are employed. This Article uses the comparative
legal method as a methodological paradigm for conceptualizing the
contours of the new legal discourse that will result from using DLT to
implement law in a disciplined way. Comparative law has been de-
scribed as the “critical method of legal science” because of its focus on
“the juxtaposing, contrasting and comparing of legal systems or parts
thereof with the aim of finding similarities and differences.”160 The
comparative enterprise takes place at both the macro and micro
level.161 At the macro level, comparative law uses an investigation of
similarities and differences to further “the universal knowledge and
phenomena of law.”162 At the micro level, the goal of comparative law
157. LAWS OF CYBERSPACE I, supra note 155, at 109 (“Code is not constant. It
changes.”).
158. As a supplement to his argument that general legal rules were sufficient to ad-
dress issues arising in cyberspace, Easterbrook also claimed that attempting to
create a law of new technology was inappropriate because the law could not keep
pace:
If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-understood technology
such as photocopiers—if we have not even managed to create well-de-
fined property rights so that people can adapt their own conduct to maxi-
mize total wealth—what chance do we have for a technology such as
computers that is mutating faster than the virus in The Andromeda
Strain?
Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 210.
159. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY 6–9 (1977) [hereinafter
FRIEDMAN, 1977]; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM 11–16 (1975)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, 1975]; Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social
Development, 4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 29 (1969); Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal
Development, 24 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 11 (1969).
160. Esin O¨ru¨cu¨, Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK
43, 44 (Esin O¨ru¨cu¨ & David Nelken eds., 2007).
161. Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 383, 387 (Mathias Reimann &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
162. O¨ru¨cu¨, supra note 160, at 46.
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is to aid foreign-law research, promote law reform, and facilitate bet-
ter understanding of other legal systems.163 Because the micro-com-
parison goals of promoting legal reform and better understanding
other legal systems directly intersect with the prospect of implement-
ing new and existing legal structures through crypto-legal structures
wherein DLT operates as a type of foreign legal system, this Article
applies elements of comparative micro-analysis to examine the impli-
cations of crypto-legal structures for the legal system, including: com-
parative study of legal cultures, the study of legal transplants, and
functional comparison.164 With those methodological tools in hand,
this Part first considers the potential effect of crypto-legal structures
on existing substantive law, arguing that they simultaneously offer a
path for simplifying law through functional equivalents in the code
and lead to the emergence of new regulatory actors. This Part next
argues that, over time, the resulting subtle shifts in substantive law
will lead to broader changes in the legal structures that comprise the
system. This Part concludes by considering how those changes in legal
structure will impact current legal culture by altering the scope of the
relevant legal actors.
A. Disruption of Substantive Law
The term substantive law refers to both “the substantive rules and
rules about how institutions should behave.”165 If DLT is approached
as a form of foreign law, the creation of a crypto-legal structure by
taking an existing legal rule and rewriting it into computer code
should be approached as an exercise in legal transplantation. Legal
transplantation is the process of taking a legal artifice from its home
jurisdiction and implementing it in a foreign, receiving jurisdiction.
Unless legal transplants are “designed to deal effectively with the spe-
cial characteristics of the recipient jurisdiction,”166 in this case DLT,
the transplanted law can have unexpected effects.167 Even when a
transplanted law has unexpected effects, it succeeds if it achieves its
function in the receiving jurisdiction.168 Understood in that light, any
consideration of legal transplants must exist alongside, and in relation
163. Id.
164. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 161, at 339, 341.
165. FRIEDMAN, 1975, supra note 159, at 14. Friedman goes on to say that “[a] legal
system is the union of ‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary rules.’ Primary rules are
norms of behavior; secondary rules are norms about those norms—how to decide
whether they are valid, how to enforce them, etc.” Id. (footnote omitted).
166. Michael S. Gal, The “Cut and Paste” of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Con-
ditions for a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J.L. REFORM 467, 469 (2007).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 472 (“I suggest defining success as the ability of the transplanted law to
achieve its goals in the transplanting country.”).
416 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:384
to, the comparative-law functional method.169 The functional method
of comparative law considers elements of a legal system in light of the
function that it serves in responding to a societal problem.170 In so
doing, the functional method recognizes that other systems may use
functional equivalents, “other institutions, legal or non-legal, that per-
form the same function,” to address the same societal problem differ-
ently.171 In other words, the first step in the transplantation process
is to identify a problem ripe for change through transplantation, here
a legal structure that would benefit from consensus on the existence of
shared facts through importation of the law into DLT-based computer
code. Then the transplantation process requires a consideration of any
institutions or elements of the receiving system, here the DLT, that
serve some or all of the same function. Only then can the transplant,
the crypto-legal structure, be successfully designed.
As a series of legal transplants from existing law into the foreign
system of DLT, the emergence of crypto-legal structures will disrupt
substantive law in at least three ways. First, crypto-legal structures
will enable the simplification of many legal rules using existing func-
tional equivalents in the DLT during the process of coding crypto-legal
structures. Second, building crypto-legal structures, as a form of legal
transplantation, will lead to the emergence of new regulatory agents:
certain self-executing elements of the code and the developers that
code the law into crypto-legal structures. Finally, crypto-legal struc-
tures will give rise to new questions for adjudication.
1. Simplification of Substantive Law
Comparative law’s functional method offers methodological tools
for recognizing that “different legal rules can play similar functions in
different societies.”172 Functionalist comparative law compares legal
169. Id. (“Several conditions for a successful transplant have been identified in the
literature. . . . Although Watson generally focused on whether a transplant will
occur or not, he implicitly identified several factors that contribute to a successful
transplant. Most importantly, he emphasized the importance of the idea behind
the law. If the idea is a good one, in that it serves to provide a suitable solution
for a legal problem, then the transplant will have higher chances of success. Yet
as many commentators have emphasized, for this condition to be fulfilled the idea
should be a good one in light of the special conditions of the transplanting juris-
diction.” (footnote omitted) (citing Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal
Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 324–26 (1978))).
170. Ralf Michaels, The Functionalism of Legal Origins, in DOES LAW MATTER? ON
LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 21, 23 (Michael Faure & Jan Smits eds., 2011).
171. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Busi-
ness Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
765, 778 (2009).
172. Tom Ginsburg, Lawrence M. Friedman’s Comparative Law, with Notes on Japan,
5 J. COMP. L. 92, 102 (2010) (citing R. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1998)).
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systems by focusing on facts, such as the effects of rules, events, and
judicial responses or decisions in response to real-life situations.173
Functionalist comparative law then considers these comparisons in
light of “the theory that [comparative law’s] objects must be under-
stood in the light of their functional relation to society.”174 Together,
these two facets of functionalist comparative law allow for the identifi-
cation of functional equivalents between two systems, that is, the
identification of institutions in each system that, even if doctrinally
different and even if one is a legal institution while the other is a non-
legal institution, fulfill similar functions.175
The idea of focusing on the function of an institution is not unique
to comparative law. In fact, the field of computer programming uses a
similar analytical approach, referred to as “systems analysis.”176 Sim-
ilar to the comparative-functional method, “[s]ystems analysis pro-
ceeds by identifying systems, discovering their goals or attributing
goals to them, mapping their subsystems and the functions each per-
forms, determining their internal structures, depicting them with at-
tention paid to efficiency of presentation, and searching for internal
inconsistencies.”177 The similarities between the two approaches give
regulators, armed with functionalist-comparative-law theory, and
DLT computer coders, armed with system analysis, common ground
for first assessing a specific existing legal structure, identifying its
functional relation to society, breaking out subsystems of the legal
structure, and identifying their functions, and then assessing which
elements of DLT, if any, endogenously fill those functions. Where DLT
does, or can be coded to, fill certain functions of the law, the substan-
tive law can be simplified as it is translated into a crypto-legal
structure.
Further analysis of the Article 9 filing system illustrates the im-
pact of translating existing legal structures into crypto-legal struc-
tures using a combination of functionalist comparative law and
systems analysis. The primary function of the Article 9 filing system is
“to communicate the existence of filed financing statements to those
who search the records.”178 To fulfill this function, Article 9 requires
that a financing statement contain the name of the debtor, the name
of the secured creditor, an indication of the collateral,179 the mailing
173. Michaels, supra note 164, at 342.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 481
(1997).
177. Id. (footnote omitted).
178. LoPucki, supra note 108, at 5.
179. These three pieces of information are required by U.C.C. § 9-502(a) in order for a
financing statement to be effective. As a result, they are referred to by some “as
‘the three holies’ of the financing statement. Each must be given, and given cor-
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address of the debtor and secured creditor, and an indication of
whether the debtor is an individual or an organization.180 A financing
statement will lapse after five years unless a continuation statement
is filed during the six-month window directly prior to the lapse date,
and all records relating to a lapsed financing statement can be deleted
from the system one year after lapse.181 When a prospective creditor
searches the filing statement for a pertinent financing statement, the
creditor may only search an index, not the full text of the document,
and the index only contains the debtor’s name as it is contained in the
financing statement on file.182
When a searcher obtains a financing statement, the “open drawer”
concept of the filing system ensures that the searcher receives “abso-
lutely everything related to the original financing statement (amend-
ments, assignments, deletions, continuation statements, termination
statements, etc.) . . . so that they have complete information as to the
current status of the filed transaction.”183 Creditors filing financing
statements make mistakes when entering the debtor’s name on the
form.184 And even when the name was correct when initially listed,
debtors change their names without informing their creditors, leaving
the creditors vulnerable to an ineffective filing statement.185 Filers
also often unintentionally forget to file a continuance statement dur-
ing the six-month continuation window.186 Article 9 contains a system
of complex and detailed rules for determining how to treat financing
statements in each of these, and a variety of other, scenarios.187 In
other words, in order for the filing system to achieve its function, Arti-
rectly, for the financing statement to be sufficient.” JAMES BROOK, PROBLEMS AND
CASES ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 145 (3d ed. 2016).
180. Although these pieces of information are not required for the financing statement
to be effective, a financing officer is directed to reject a financing statement un-
less it contains the names of the debtor and secured creditor and these three
additional items. See U.C.C. § 9-520(a), reprinted in CHOMSKY ET AL., supra note
107, at 885.
181. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS 112 (9th ed. 2014) (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-515, -522).
182. See U.C.C. § 9-519(c), reprinted in CHOMSKY ET AL., supra note 107, at 883; see
also LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at 296 (“U.C.C. § 9-519(c) requires that the
filing office index financing statements according to the name of the debtor.”).
183. WHALEY & MCJOHN, supra note 181, at 113.
184. See LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at 298–303 (describing difficulties in identi-
fying correct name for use in financing statements).
185. Id. at 394–96 (describing difficulty in maintaining an accurate financing state-
ment through debtor name changes).
186. Id. at 388 (“Failure to file a necessary continuation statement timely is both a
common error and a common source of legal malpractice claims.”).
187. See U.C.C. §§ 9-338, -502, -503, -504, -506, -510, -515, -516, -518, -520 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); see also LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at
294–307, 311–21, 375–89, 393–404 (detailing the intricacies of applying these
rules to common factual scenarios experienced by creditors).
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cle 9 must supplement the filing system with legal rules intended to
help mitigate the shortcomings of the system as it actually operates
(in contrast to how it was intended to operate).
A primary function of DLT is providing a tamper-resistant, distrib-
uted, self-executing ledger of value transfers. Although the initial
records recorded on DLT relate to monetary transfers, protocols have
been built on top of those ledgers to offer a primary function of record-
ing events other than monetary transfers. An example of such a proto-
col is that created by the Texas-based company Factom.188 Factom
designed a system of independent “censorship resistant blockchain[s]
which [are] rendered immutable by the Bitcoin blockchain.”189 “En-
tries into the Factom Network are collected by federated nodes and
protected against change using the Bitcoin hashpower.”190 In Factom,
users can specify the rules for their chain, mandate that the initial
entry in the chain hold a set of rules, and specify an enforced sequence
to require the chain to automatically reject invalid entries.191 Factom
enables users to include whatever information in its chain entries that
serves the purpose of the user.192
To create a crypto-legal structure that serves the function of the
Article 9 filing system, the state filing office could create a Factom
chain (or other similar DLT protocol) for use in recording financing
statements. Each financing statement would represent an entry in the
chain. The entries could continue to be indexed by name of the debtor
so that a search would hit on all chain entries related to a particular
debtor. The initial chain entry would specify the names of the debtor
and secured party and indicate the collateral required for the financ-
ing statement to be effective, and an audit program could be con-
structed for validating this content. The enforced sequence would
ensure that financing statements that do not contain the information
required by U.C.C. § 9-520(a) are rejected. The enforced sequence
would, therefore, serve the function of the filing officer in rejecting or
188. See generally Paul Snow et al., Business Processes Secured by Immutable Audit
Trails on the Blockchain, FACTOM (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.factom.com/devs/
docs/guide/factom-white-paper-1-0 [https://perma.unl.edu/C2D4-AKFR].
189. Factom Foundation, FACTOM, https://www.factom.com/devs/factom-foundation
[https://perma.unl.edu/WCP4-WJNX].
190. Id. A user of a Factom chain can write an unlimited number of entries into the
system.
The entries are organized into hierarchical sets of blocks. These blocks
are then used to compute for a single hash every 10 minutes. We take
these hashes and anchor them into other blockchains for redundant se-
curity. This design allows applications to write transactions faster, at a
much lower cost, and with greater scalability than other blockchains. It
also allows users to forgo dealing in tradable tokens.
Id.
191. Snow, et al., supra note 188.
192. Id.
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accepting filings. The difference is that the enforced sequence would
not, as is common at filing offices, incorrectly accept a filing that
should be rejected for failure to comply. As a result, the rules regard-
ing the partial effectiveness of wrongfully accepted filings could be
eliminated.193 Furthermore, compatible programming could be im-
planted into the initial chain entry to audit the chain for financing
statements that are approaching the continuance window so that the
secured party receives a reminder when a continuance statement
should be filed.194
Doing so could simplify priority analysis and reduce litigation re-
lating to unintentionally lapsed filings.195 Every time a creditor filed
an amendment or termination statement relating to an accepted fi-
nancing statement, the chain would be updated accordingly; however,
the prior history of the financing statement would not be lost and can-
not be altered. The enforced sequence could incorporate an audit sys-
tem that linked to the electronic databases of the Secretary of State’s
corporate records and state driver’s-license records to monitor for
changes in a debtor’s name or location.196 By eliminating the function
of the Article 9 rules providing for grace periods to account for the
difficulty in tracing name changes,197 the crypto-legal structure would
allow Article 9 to eliminate, or at least simplify, those rules as well.
Amendments and new filings relating to transfers of collateral could
be linked to corresponding entries in the chain, again allowing for sim-
plification of the rules relating to grace periods for changes affecting
information in the financing statement.198 Finally, the ten-minute
processing time would reduce the complexities of the existing system
with regard to the “as of” filing dates when ordering searches,199 and
the ability of the chain to preserve the full history of the financing
statement would achieve the current system’s open-drawer policy.
Although a fully operational proposal for a crypto-legal structure
that would modernize the Article 9 filing system would require much
more detail, this summary demonstrates that, by capitalizing on fea-
tures built into the DLT chosen to implement a crypto-legal structure
(and this Article predicts that different DLT will work best for differ-
193. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-516, -520, reprinted in CHOMSKY ET AL., supra note 107, at
878–80, 885–86.
194. I note here that Factom makes clear that this programming would need to be
implemented client-side; that is, at the level of the filing office and not as a direct
action by the chain.
195. LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at 375–89 (detailing the common problems en-
gendered by the lapse system and providing examples of significant litigation).
196. I recognize that to do so would require negotiation of other applicable laws, such
as those governing access to driver’s-license records. However, the technological
point that DLT makes doing so possible remains.
197. U.C.C. § 9-507, reprinted in CHOMSKY ET AL., supra note 107, at 866–67.
198. U.C.C. § 9-508, reprinted in CHOMSKY ET AL., supra note 107, 868–89.
199. LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 100, at 297.
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ent crypto-legal structures) and finding where those features serve the
same functions as existing legal rules, substantive law can be simpli-
fied when creating the crypto-legal structure.200 Arguably, the simpli-
fication also resolves many of the difficulties faced by the Article 9
system as a whole.201
2. Emergence of New Regulatory Actors
Even as the functional method enables simplification of substan-
tive law implemented through crypto-legal structures, comparative
scholarship on legal transplants instructs us to expect new legal ele-
ments and actors to emerge from transplanting law into DLT. In the
process of creating crypto-legal structures, DLT is the foreign legal
system, and the law to be implemented through DLT is the trans-
plant. As “a central ‘paradigm’ in comparative law,”202 the concept of
legal transplants “investigates contacts of legal cultures and explores
the complex patterns of change triggered by them.”203 The study of
legal transplants led to an intense and extensive debate between two
historically prominent comparative legal scholars, Alan Watson and
Pierre Legrand, regarding whether legal transplants are possible, and
if so, to what extent they are valuable.204 Alan Watson argued that
legal transplants are not only possible but have occurred throughout
history, and opined that as a result, they are of utmost value to the
comparative legal scholar.205 Pierre Legrand, on the other hand, ar-
gued just as forcefully that legal transplants do not exist, and as a
result, there is little value for the comparative legal scholar in pursu-
ing the study of such imaginary concepts.206 In the gap between these
two extreme positions, comparative legal scholars have developed a
substantial body of literature devoted to the study of why, with what
effect, and how legal transplants take place.
The comparative study of legal transplants has identified several
reasons for why legal transplants are undertaken, including techno-
logical change.207 With regard to the effect of legal transplants, many
200. Note that, as a result, this specific crypto-legal structure might be best built for
and recommended by the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commis-
sion, and then recommended to the states as part of the uniform-law process.
201. For an in-depth assessment of those difficulties, see LoPucki, supra note 108.
202. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 161, at 441, 443.
203. Id. at 442.
204. Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, , supra note 161, at 477, 487–89.
205. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21–30
(2d ed. 1993).
206. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”, 42 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
& COMP. L. 111 (1997).
207. Graziadei, supra note 202, at 455. Other identified reasons include migration of a
population, religious influence, imposition following military conquest, imitation
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comparative legal scholars recognize that “when those vested with au-
thority have decided what law to import, the process of adaptation to
the local environment will often add new and unexpected elements to
the import.”208 Thus, a transplant should not be expected to work ex-
actly the same way when implemented through computer code as
when implemented in writing, by a regulator, or by a judge.209 As
Watson explained, “[a] successful legal transplant—like that of a
human organ—will grow in its new body and become part of that body
just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its
parent system. Subsequent development in the host system should not
be confused with rejection.”210 Gunther Teubner explained it another
way, saying the term legal transplant “creates the wrong impression
that after a difficult surgical operation the transferred material will
remain identical with itself playing its old role in the new organ-
ism.”211 Because some legal institutions are so intricately intertwined
because of the perceived prestige of a legal paradigm, and transplants under-
taken at the behest of international economic institutions. Id. at 456–61.
208. Id. at 465; see also WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 51
(2d ed. 2006) (“[R]eceived laws have everywhere been adapted to suit local condi-
tions, and transplants everywhere manifest themselves as new hybrids.” (foot-
note omitted)); Gu¨nter Frankenberg, Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory
Revisited, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 563 (2010) (discussing this idea as “recontextual-
ization”); Graziadei, supra note 202, at 465 (“[T]he process of adaptation to the
local environment will often add new and unexpected elements to the import.
This is inevitable. It makes little sense to view these additions as distortions of
the original model that would inexplicably fail to be reproduced locally.”); Ralf
Michaels, “One Size Can Fit All”—On the Mass Production of Legal Transplants,
in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE (CONSTITUTIONAL) LAW 18
(Gutner Frankeberg ed., 2013) (“People take Ikea furniture and assemble it dif-
ferently from the producer’s intention. And then they share their new construc-
tions on the internet and can thus inspire other users. Such creative reuse may
not be favored by IKEA—just as the creative re-use of legal rules in a recipient
country may not be what the donor country intended. But it may well serve the
needs in the recipient country.” (footnote omitted)); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irri-
tants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Diver-
gences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998) (arguing that transplants must be
understood instead as “legal irritants,” “which triggers a whole series of new and
unexpected events”).
209. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD 75, 100 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) (“Although it is
highly unlikely that the transplanted system will operate as it did in its country
of origin or as intended by the borrowing country, it does not follow that it will
have no social effect.” (footnote omitted)).
210. WATSON, supra note 205, at 27. Recent scholarship, even while arguing that a
one-size-fits-all approach can work, nevertheless agrees with this understanding
of legal transplants. See Michaels, supra note 207, 17 (“It is true, as critics of
transplants have pointed out, that legal rules will often acquire a different mean-
ing in the recipient country than they do in the donor country. An attempt to
replicate the meaning and effects from the donor country in the recipient country
is thus doomed to fail.”).
211. Teubner, supra note 208, at 12.
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with social norms, a transplant will not only cause a legal change but
will also trigger changes in the related social system.212 The social
change will then cause the society to revisit the form of the trans-
planted legal institution, creating a cycle of change.213 As a result,
comparative law expects the transplant to change and grow until the
institution resembles an organic part of the importing society.
Considering the nature of DLT and smart contracts, the emergence
of crypto-legal structures will introduce new regulatory actors into the
legal sphere: certain self-executing elements of the code and the devel-
opers that translate the law into code. Administrative law and admin-
istrative practice dictate the interaction between the governed and the
regulators that govern.214 Taken together, administrative law and ad-
ministrative practice form a system in which “congress regulates by
delegating to intermediaries whose behavior is shaped by the rules
and practices governing administrative decisionmaking.”215 In this
context, the regulatory process is shaped by ever-changing combina-
tions of administrative law, administrative behavior (“the informal
norms that inform regulatory decisions”), oversight by the other
branches of government, and each agency’s “organizational structure
and culture.”216
The introduction of crypto-legal structures will disrupt these ele-
ments of the regulatory system as it is presently known and under-
stood in at least two ways. First, because the smart-contracting
features of DLT that will make many of the crypto-legal structures
possible are self-executing, those features arguably become new regu-
latory agents. In the computer-science discipline that created DLT,
the term “agent” includes “a piece of software that acts on behalf of its
user and tries to meet certain objectives or complete tasks without any
direct input or direct supervision from its user,”217 and “computa-
tional systems that inhabit some complex dynamic environment,
sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing so real-
212. Id. at 28.
213. Id.
214. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Pro-
cess, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 & n.8 (1998) (“ ‘Administrative law’ refers simply to
the legal-formal rules and doctrines governing the relationship between regula-
tors and private parties—the ‘law on the books.’ ‘Administrative practice’ refers
to the operation of those rules in actual administrative decisionmaking
processes—focusing on who, when, and how parties participate in those
processes.”).
215. Id. at 26–27.
216. Id. at 28.
217. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFI-
CIAL AGENTS 6 (2011) (quoting JOHN J. BORKING, B.M.A. VAN ECK & P. SIEPEL,
INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS: TURNING PRIVACY THREAT INTO A PRIVACY PRO-
TECTOR (1999)).
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ize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed.”218 Under such
a conception, computer code can take on its own autonomous agency.
In the context of cryptolaw, this might take the form of a crypto-legal
structure composed of smart contracts with embedded elements of
predictive technology and machine-learning algorithms. In such a
case, the crypto-legal structure could be driven by a crypto-regulatory
agent—computer code that
possess[es] a goal-directed nature: a final result may be specified and [code],
given knowledge of the actions required to accomplish a task, can autono-
mously decide how to carry out the task given its resources and the features of
the environment; it can select among the various choices available to it along
several dimensions of preference.219
In other words, cryptolaw would enable a world of microdirec-
tives220 in which, instead of delivering a microdirective or range of
microdirectives to an individual for choice of compliance, a range of
microdirectives is derived, a choice is made, and the choice is exe-
cuted, all by the crypto-regulatory agent that exists within the crypto-
legal structure.221 Such crypto-regulatory agents would arguably
qualify as legal agents of their human regulator principals.222 Al-
though such a suggestion may sound radical upon first read, some
218. Id. (quoting Pattie Maes, Artificial Life Meets Entertainment: Lifelike Autono-
mous Agents, 38 COMM. ACM 108, 108–14 (1995)).
219. Id. at 9.
220. Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 1–3 (describing a microdirective as an easy-to-
follow behavioral directive for legal compliance created by technology). Casey and
Niblett explain that microdirectives will be created through the following process:
First, they will take a standard-like policy objective, analyze its applica-
tion in all possible contexts, and create a vast catalog of legal rules—
each of which is tailored to best achieve the objective in a specific scena-
rio. Second, when a regulated actor is in any actual scenario, the technol-
ogies will search the vast catalog and identify the specific rules that are
applicable. Third, they will translate those rules into a simple micro-
directive on how the regulated actor can comply with the law. Fourth,
they will communicate that micro-directive to the regulated actor in a
timely and efficient manner.
Id. at 12.
221. This is made possible, in part, by the smart-contracting features of DLT, which,
when combined with predictive technology and machine-learning capacity, en-
able autonomous execution of the program. DLT can be imbued with
the ability to operate without the direct intervention of humans or other
agents, and to exert nonsupervised control over its own actions and in-
ternal states; the social ability or capacity to interact with other artificial
agents or with human beings; the proactive ability to initiate goal-di-
rected behavior; the reactive ability to perceive an environment and re-
spond to changes within it; the ability to adjust to the habits, working
methods, and preferences of users, other agents, or humans; the ability
to move around a virtual or physical environment; and representative-
ness, or the attribute of being a representative of, or intermediary for,
another agent or person.
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 217, at 10 (footnote omitted).
222. Id. at 23.
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case law takes this very approach and views computer systems as the
legal agents of the corporate entities that employ them.223 Alterna-
tively, such crypto-regulatory agents may be viewed as possessing
their own legal personhood, in light of the fact that “[t]hey take ac-
tions that they initiate, and their actions can be understood as
originating in their own reasons.”224 In either case, the choices made
by the crypto-regulatory agent will not always be the expected
choice.225 What remedies will belong to the governed when the com-
puter code makes an unexpected or undesirable decision, or both? Who
will be at fault if the code executes prematurely because it misread the
circumstances? Who will be penalized when compliance efforts are
compromised because the designated crypto-regulatory agent took an
unpredictable turn? These and other similar new questions of sub-
stantive law will emerge along with the rise of these new regulatory
agents, disrupting the present understanding and theory underpin-
ning substantive areas of law such as that governing the administra-
tive process.
A second regulatory actor will emerge as well—the developers that
code the law and create the crypto-legal structures and the crypto-
regulatory agents that execute them. Lessig argued that coders were
already playing this role in the early days of the Internet. “As the
world is now,” Lessig wrote in 1999, “code writers are increasingly
lawmakers. They determine what the defaults of the Internet will be;
whether privacy will be protected; the degree to which anonymity will
be allowed; the extent to which access will be guaranteed.”226 His dis-
cussion of that phenomenon arguably made the case for coders exer-
223. United States v. Flowerday, 28 M.J. 705, 707–09 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989); Thrifty-Tel,
Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
224. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 217, at 189. But see Annemarie Bridy, Coding Crea-
tivity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
5, 21 (“The law as it is currently configured cannot vest ownership of the copy-
right in a procedurally generated work in the work’s author-in-fact because the
work’s author-in-fact—a generative software program—has no legal personhood.”
(footnote omitted)); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Crea-
tive Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1675, 1696–97 (1997) (looking at patent law and the requirement of a human
inventor). Notably, these authors examine laws which would offer legal privileges
to the computer program, whereas when the program is acting as a regulatory
actor, the law would seek to place responsibility on the computer program.
Whether that distinction matters for the purposes of determining whether and
when to extend legal personhood to certain autonomous, creative computer
software, or both, deserves further attention, but that is beyond the scope of this
Article.
225. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 540
(2015) (“The prospect of useful but unexpected problem solving by machines
presents a number of challenges for the law.”).
226. LAWS OF CYBERSPACE I, supra note 155, at 60.
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cising soft power.227 Just as crypto-legal structures can be conceived
of as an extreme form of code as law, so too can the role of the coders in
creating these structures be seen as playing an enhanced regulatory
role in comparison to the role Lessig described. In cryptolaw, coders
would no longer exert soft regulatory power by merely developing the
norms that shape DLT. Instead, the coders step into the role of actual
regulators, exerting the regulatory coercive powers of the state.
This new, enhanced role of coders will lead to new issues for adju-
dication, especially considering the changes to enforcement structures
predicted in Part III.B. below. When a crypto-regulatory agent goes
rogue, can the governed pursue remedies against the developer that
created it? What if the code was flawed from the beginning; would the
developer be subject to a product liability claim for failure to code a
law properly?
Further, extensive research evidences the extent to which develop-
ers frequently write implicit biases into the code and algorithms they
create.228 For example, research demonstrates that although credit
scores are held out as impartial predictors of credit worthiness, the
scores are generated by algorithms that engrain bias into the system
rather than eliminate it.229 “Credit scores” they explain,
are only as free from bias as the software and data behind them. Software
engineers construct the data sets mined by scoring systems; they define the
parameters of data-mining analysis; they create the clusters, links, and deci-
sion trees applied; they generate the predictive models applied. The biases
and values of system developers and software programmers are embedded
into each and every stage of development.230
These concerns are compounded by the inherent risk that technologi-
cal automation of legal processes may erode procedural safeguards for
individual rights.231 For example, “[s]ome systems adjudicate in se-
cret, while others lack recordkeeping audit trails, making review of
the law and facts supporting a system’s decisions impossible.”232
As cryptolaw begins to take shape, processes for rooting out such
bias and increasing protections for individual rights could be devel-
oped to prevent similar outcomes from infecting crypto-legal struc-
tures by choosing the mix of DLT services best suited for that purpose.
227. Id. Lessig argued that the code writers influenced norms that regulate behavior
because “[t]hey are the ones who set [the Internet’s] nature. Their decisions, now
made in the interstices of how the Net is coded, define what the Net is.” Id.
228. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 110–13 (2015).
229. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 13.
230. Id. at 13–14 (footnotes omitted).
231. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1253 (2008) (“Computer programs seamlessly combine rulemaking and individ-
ual adjudications without the critical procedural protections owed either of them.
Automation generates unforeseen problems for the adjudication of important in-
dividual rights.” (footnote omitted)).
232. Id. (footnote omitted).
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If certain bias creeps into crypto-legal structures anyway, what reme-
dies will be available to those governed by them? Will the developer be
subject to suit? Will the regulatory body that hired the developer be
the proper target for suit? Further, if the developers code the crypto-
regulatory agents and those agents choose among microdirectives for
the governed in a self-executing enforcement of certain laws, will that
not signal a subtle shift away from adjudication as an activity of the
judicial branch and towards placing the power of adjudication, in real
time, in the hands of regulatory agencies led by one or both of the
other branches of government? How often, and to what degree, will
that adjudication be influenced by the hidden bias of the software
developer?
Although for some these questions might invite a prediction of the
death of adjudication,233 I predict instead, by following the compara-
tive insights from functional equivalence and legal transplants to
their logical conclusion, that the emergence of cryptolaw will simply
lead to new adjudicators, forms of adjudication, and issues for adjudi-
cation. We might imagine a subtle shift in the issues adjudicated by
judges, with the more mundane issues decided by smart-contracting
crypto-legal structures and the crypto-legal agents that make them
run, while the new, more daunting issues of who to hold accountable
for bugs in crypto-legal structures, when bugs have occurred and
when such bugs have caused damage to individuals, will be pushed to
the top of the judicial docket. We might imagine that such a dual-
tiered system of adjudication could be conceived of as “crypto-
adjudication.”234
Over time, then, an aggregation of interacting crypto-legal struc-
tures with varying levels of autonomy will result in the simplification
and reconfiguration of substantive law and reconstitute the makeup of
legal actors in the administrative process. These changes will impact
the legal system beyond the substance of law because, ultimately, sub-
stantive law is connected to the structure of institutions through
which regulatory action unfolds.235 Consequently, these subtle shifts
in substantive law will lead to more seismic shifts in the foundations
of the legal system—in the legal structures that make up the system.
B. Disruption of Legal Structure
The term “legal structure” refers to a legal system’s “skeletal
framework; it is the permanent shape, the institutional body of the
system, the tough rigid bones that keep the process flowing within
233. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 39 (“The proliferation of clear micro-
directives largely obviates the need for ex post adjudication.”).
234. Admittedly, such issues deserve their own thorough examination, and I therefore
acknowledge here that they exist but reserve further comment for later work.
235. Croley, supra note 214, at 27.
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bounds.”236 Essentially, each “[s]tructure becomes . . .  custom or
habit” such that “social meanings clump about each structure,” giving
them “social-psychological and cultural boundaries.”237 As a result,
“[s]tructures are patterns of behavior that persist over time—vessels
or containers that the culture slowly welds into shapes.”238 Cryptolaw
can be conceptualized as disruptive discourse regarding existing legal
structures in at least two important ways. First, the emergence of
crypto-legal structures in societies that rely heavily on common law
adjudication will disrupt established patterns of legal enforcement.
Second, the emergence of crypto-legal structures will disrupt the pol-
icy considerations that inform lawmakers’ choices when constructing
laws, disrupting established forms of law. Ultimately, the cryptolaw
discourse may disrupt the way that the governed interact with the law
as the governed attach new social meanings to the new crypto-legal
structures that emerge.
1. Disruption of Established Patterns of Enforcement and
Related Regulatory Policy Choices
At the broadest level, legal structures are tied to legal tradi-
tions,239 meaning that a legal system’s roots in the English common
law or the French civil law stem from that system’s unique historical
and political context, and thereby significantly impact the shape of the
236. FRIEDMAN, 1975, supra note 159, at 14.
237. Id. at 158.
238. Id. at 162.
239. I recognize that there is a debate in the literature regarding the extent to which
the difference in legal structures roughly corresponds to a difference in legal tra-
ditions (or legal origins, depending upon whether your primary discipline is law
and economics or comparative law). See, e.g., Holger Spamann, Contemporary Le-
gal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU
L. REV. 1813, 1813–14 (“Contemporary knowledge on comparative legal systems
is strangely bifurcated. On the one hand, some of the most sophisticated compar-
ative lawyers assert that there are few if any relevant differences between com-
mon and civil law today, judging by key characteristics of the legal system, such
as case law versus statutory law, the systemization of the law, or the lasting
influence of Roman law, which are the traditional markers of the common/civil
law distinction. On the other hand, a very influential literature in economics—
known as the ‘legal origins literature’—claims that empirically, the substantive
rules in areas of economic policy ranging from investor protection to military con-
scription differ systematically between common and civil law countries.” (foot-
notes omitted)). That debate is beyond the scope of this Article. I mention it here
only to recognize its prevalence and to note that if cryptolaw disrupts legal struc-
tures in the ways predicted throughout this Article, the debate may be rendered
moot as the underlying premises upon which it is based may transform alto-
gether as crypto-legal structures replace many of the structures we take for
granted at present. While this point may be worthy of its own detailed treatment,
I make it here in passing to drive home the idea that the potential disruptive
effect of cryptolaw on law as we know it runs vast and deep.
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legal structures within the system.240 Both systems employ the legal
structure of codes of laws.241 In the common law system, such codes
and statutes are expected to interact dynamically with judge-made
law, giving practitioners and judges “some flexibility to disregard
[code] provisions when they conflict with the basic principles of com-
mon law.”242 Common law systems view the common law itself as a
legal structure, considering it to be the “legal repository of the moral
values of the people.”243 On the other hand, in civil law jurisdictions,
judges are expected to exercise deference to the provisions of the code,
which makes codes arguably much more powerful in civil law jurisdic-
tions than common law jurisdictions.244 The emergence of cryptolaw
has the potential to disrupt this fundamental difference between legal
structures. By translating statutes and regulations into crypto-
graphic, smart-contracting computer code to create crypto-legal struc-
tures, the gap between the importance of codes in common and civil
law jurisdictions will narrow.245 Crypto-legal structures will self-exe-
cute, and enforcement will occur in real time,246 reducing flexibility to
later argue before a judge that any violation was a result of complying
with overruling principles of common law.
The implication for the common law system in the United States is
that by disrupting established patterns of enforcement, cryptolaw will
also disrupt the practical aspects of and theoretical justifications for
legislation and its implementing regulations. Legislation and imple-
menting regulations are legal structures because they are unquestion-
ably patterns of behavior that have persisted over time in
industrialized nations.247 Scholars have argued for decades about the
240. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Edward L. Glaeser, Legal Origins, in THE FAIL-
URE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS 209 (Andrei Shleifer ed., 2012).
241. Id. at 226.
242. Id.
243. DAVID DYZENHAUS, RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW 3 (1999). Dyzenhaus also de-
scribes the common law as “value-laden background against which legislation is
be interpreted,” making it clear that the common law itself fits within Friedman’s
conception of a legal structure. Id.
244. Shleifer & Glaeser, supra note 240, at 226.
245. Or, arguably, depending on your position in the debate on the degree of difference
between legal traditions, the gap will narrow further.
246. There is a debate in the literature regarding whether it is advisable to make
noncompliance with laws impossible through technology. See, e.g., Michael L.
Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795 (2013).
This Article does not engage that debate but acknowledges, particularly in Part
III, that the issues raised in that debate are both important and applicable to the
emergence of cryptolaw and the implication of cryptolaw on the legal system.
247. Andrei Shleifer, The Enforcement Theory of Regulation, in THE FAILURE OF
JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS, supra note 240, at 1, 1 (“Government regu-
lation is extensive in all rich and middle-income countries. . . . There is surely a
lot of variation across countries, but it pales by comparison with the raw fact of
ubiquity.”).
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social-psychological and cultural boundaries that push societies to
choose regulation over other legal structures.248 One prominent the-
ory regarding the social meaning clumped around regulatory artifices
is that regulation is a less expensive, more predictable, less biased al-
ternative to enforcing legal rules than court-based adjudication.249 In
this conception of regulation, it does not matter whether regulation is
in the form of government ownership of a market, rules for required
precautions that impose penalties for compliance failures, or rules left
to private enforcement. Rather, what matters is that the public trusts
a regulated world because regulation is thought to reduce costs of bus-
iness by more precisely defining the requisites for liability.250 Others
argue that regulators undertake decisions after considering alterna-
tives in the context of a regulatory economy governed by supply-and-
demand-based exchanges of regulatory goods.251 In this public-choice
theory, regulatory decisions result from the meeting of private eco-
nomic demands by political supply from the public sector.252 Another
group of scholars argues that regulatory outcomes reflect the relative
investment of various groups in obtaining public goods to further their
interests.253 A variety of other explanations for regulatory outcomes
compete with those mentioned here.254
Technology both challenges these theories255 and offers new ways
to make the policy choices that lead to regulatory outcomes. For exam-
ple, law-and-technology scholars have argued that technology can,
and perhaps should, disrupt the basis for lawmaking for some time.
Some argue that technological advances in harvesting and marshal-
ling data enables real-time feedback to regulators for use in a dynamic
model of regulation that allows more rapid response to market
248. See generally Croley, supra note 214; George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Reg-
ulation and the “Theories of Regulation” Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993).
249. Shleifer, supra note 247, at 15.
250. Id. at 17.
251. Croley, supra note 214, at 34 (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)).
252. Id. at 35.
253. Id. at 57 (citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983)) (describing the “neopluralist
theory” of regulation by Gary Becker).
254. A full catalogue of these theories is beyond the scope of this Article, but they
include the public-interest theory, the civic-republican theory, see Croley, supra
note 214, at 65–85, and the capture theory, see Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).
255. Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 5 (“The ex-post facts-based and trial-and-
error-rulemaking with stable and presumptively optimal rules in the existing
regulatory framework often produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes that are no
longer sustainable in an environment of exponential disruptive innovation.” (foot-
notes omitted)); see Wulf. A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services
Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 791 (2013).
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changes.256 Additionally, the “RegTech” phenomena in the context of
the BSA Regulations provides evidence that the market also hopes to
push regulation toward a more technology-driven, rapidly responsive
regulatory environment. RegTech, shorthand for regulatory technol-
ogy, offers BSA-covered financial institutions automated systems for
complying with the detailed reporting required by the BSA Regula-
tions.257 The financial and FinTech industries encourage regulators to
further adapt RegTech compliance solutions through tailored drafting
and enforcing of the BSA Regulations and related compliance obliga-
tions.258 The emergence of crypto-legal structures will allow industry
further opportunity to bring order, predictability, and efficiency to
compliance efforts while disrupting the theories of regulation and the
legal structures that they seek to explain. Specifically, cryptolaw will
bring theories of data-driven dynamic regulation, endogenous regula-
tion, and the RegTech phenomena to their logical conclusions.
RegTech would no longer be limited to technology that assists covered
institutions in meeting their compliance obligations more efficiently,
but rather, the technology would be the regulation. A firm that adopts
the prescribed crypto-legal structure would be prima facie compliant
and would maintain a designation of compliance so long as its systems
passed regular audits. Audits could be conducted efficiently and at
regular intervals, with variances prescribed for rogue actors. Firms
that failed audits would become natural targets for enforcement. Fur-
ther, the public would be more readily able to ascertain which compa-
nies are compliant and worthy of trust and which companies should be
avoided. In other words, the regulators could bake the regulatory the-
ory into the code, making regulatory objectives more transparent to
the industry subject to them and offering public benchmarks for as-
sessing which entities are responsible corporate citizens.
This added element of transparency for both the regulator and the
regulated will alter the theories of regulation debate, adding new the-
256. Kaal & Vermeluen, supra note 15, at 4 (“We show that data derived from venture
capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement that can
help address the legal challenges presented by disruptive innovation. Venture
capital’s financial allocations to innovative projects can provide feedback for dy-
namic regulation of disruptive innovation.”).
257. Elzio Barreto, Financial Firms Seek RegTech to Cut Regulatory Chores, Fight
Crime, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-fintech-
regulations-idUSKBN1360UQ [https://perma.unl.edu/7ZPJ-RT79].
258. Kevin Petrasic, Benjamin Saul & Helen Lee, RegTech Rising: Automating Regu-
lation for Financial Institutions, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www
.whitecase.com/publications/insight/regtech-rising-automating-regulation-finan
cial-institutions [https://perma.unl.edu/6CUA-EFFF] (“A growing number of com-
panies and regulators use regtech solutions to increase the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of compliance while reducing costs. Regtech may also prove essential to
regulating emerging fintech applications that are difficult to monitor or manage
under legacy regimes.”).
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ories and making certain existing theories more relevant. In other
words, cryptolaw offers a disruptive new way to think about the justi-
fications for and purposes of regulation and enforcement even more so
than current law-and-technology literature expects that big-data,
RegTech, predictive, and other technology will. Most immediately,
cryptolaw presents an opportunity to consider new theories of regula-
tory process, and, in the long term, thereby endogenously give rise to
new ways of thinking about regulatory origin.
2. Disruption of Choices in Legal Forms
Because cryptolaw offers disruptive new models for regulatory pro-
cess, origin, decision-making, and enforcement, cryptolaw should also
be expected to disrupt the structural choices of lawmakers as they en-
act laws. The most obvious area for such disruption is in the
lawmakers’ choice between rules and standards. The premise that
technology will disrupt the choice between enacting law in the form of
rules or standards is not new. Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett
argue that advances in predictive and communication technology will
enable a system that “identif[ies] the rules applicable to an actual sit-
uation and inform[s] the regulated actor exactly how to comply with
the law.”259 As a result, they argue that these “micro-directives will
become the dominant form of law, culminating in the death of rules
and standards.”260 Casey and Niblett predict that although the legis-
lature may view its role as creating laws that continue to look like
standards, the regulated individual will only see a “simple and easy-
to-follow directive.”261 Notably, a microdirective leaves the regulated
individual a choice of whether to comply with the instruction or not.262
Although Casey and Niblett argue that this will lead to a reduced role
for judges, it may also lead to new questions for adjudication. For ex-
ample, what claim would an individual have if he or she follows the
microdirective to his or her detriment? What happens if the underly-
ing algorithm leading to the microdirective is flawed? When does an
individual have a defense for ignoring a microdirective given the cir-
cumstances facing the individual?
Crypto-legal structures will further alter the way in which the reg-
ulated individual receives and interacts with the law. Conceived of as
an extreme form of code as law, crypto-legal structures present a
mechanism for covered entities to efficiently comply with regulations
and to ensure that their customers undertake compliant transactions.
In the BSA Regulations context, for example, the financial institution
259. Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 3.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 4.
262. Casey & Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, supra note 22, at 439 (“Upon receiving the
micro-directive, the individuals may still elect to violate the law.”).
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must choose whether to be prima facie compliant or not. FinCEN
could keep a list of those covered institutions that adopt compliant
crypto-legal structures and are therefore at low risk of allowing
money-laundering activity or suspicious transactions. In turn, individ-
ual consumers would be presented with a choice: bank with an institu-
tion that the world knows to be compliant or bank with an institution
that essentially operates in the shadows. The result is that once the
initial compliance choice is made, the self-executing code of the crypto-
legal structure ensures that compliance trickles down to all actors in
the institution, including individual consumers. The change to legal
structures would be significant. The effect would be that the choice of
whether to comply with a legal rule would no longer be limited to indi-
vidual transactions but rather to patterns of behavior overall.
As Casey and Niblett acknowledge, “the move from micro-direc-
tives to automatic restraint and strict coercion is enormous.”263
Crypto-legal structures represent a vehicle for the move from
microdirectives to automatic restraint. Where the microdirective ap-
pears to the regulated individual as an easy-to-follow instruction,
crypto-legal structures would not appear so vividly, but rather, they
would become embedded in the fabric of society. An individual’s choice
would be limited to whether to participate in the law-abiding society
or not, and individual choices on more discrete issues would be nar-
rowed from within the system of operation accordingly. Although this
may raise considerations of individual autonomy that cause alarm,264
it also offers some benefit. Specifically, the interwoven nature of regu-
lation would allow for greater endogenous feedback loops to enable
regulation to more closely reflect economic and social realities. As Les-
sig once conceptualized it in the context of the Internet, “[w]e can
build, or architect, or code [crypto-legal structures] to protect values
that we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code
[crypto-legal structures] to allow those values to disappear.”265 The
decisions about how to balance these competing interests will reshape
choices in legal forms, ultimately reshaping the way lawmakers think
about the law they make, not just in terms of rules and standards but
also in the appropriate mix of ex ante regulation and ex post facto
punishment.266 Such fundamental changes will culminate in a signifi-
cant disruption of legal culture.
C. Disruption of Legal Culture
Conceptualizing cryptolaw as disruptive legal discourse highlights
the significant impact that crypto-legal structures will make on the
263. Id. at 440.
264. Indeed, such issues should be considered at length in future work.
265. LAWS OF CYBERSPACE I, supra note 155, at 6.
266. See my initial consideration of this issue in Reyes, supra note 19.
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understanding, study, and significance of legal cultures and legal tra-
ditions, and their role in shaping real-life interactions with the law.
Varying definitions of the concept of legal culture exist. Comparative
legal scholars consider that “[l]egal culture often describes merely an
extended understanding of law and is thus synonymous with ‘living
law’ (Eugen Ehrilch) or ‘law in action’ (Roscoe Pound).”267 Law-and-
sociology scholars view legal culture “as the values, ideas and atti-
tudes that a society has with respect to its law (Lawrence M. Fried-
man, James Q. Whitman).”268 Friedman viewed legal culture as the
“attitudes, values, and opinions held in society, with regard to law, the
legal system, and its various parts.”269 According to Friedman, “[I]t is
the legal culture which determines when, why, and where people use
law, legal institutions, or legal process; and when they use other insti-
tutions, or do nothing.”270 In this vein, the law as lawyers understand
it may vary by community because a “shared mental model” of law in
such communities “implicitly proclaims ‘this is how we do things’” and
therefore, legal culture serves as “primary law,” while the law on the
books acts as “merely background with which the model interacts.”271
In other words:
[T]he term “legal cultures” . . . stands for an operative and creative contribu-
tion, through social activity rooted in underlying social culture, to express how
people experience legal phenomenon, conceived as a kind of objectified poten-
267. Ralf Michaels, Legal Culture, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
(Basedow, Hopt & Zimmermann eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).
268. Id.
269. FRIEDMAN, 1977, supra note 159, at 76. As Professor Michaels indicates, many
variations on the definition of legal culture, to the extent scholars bother to use
an explicit definition when wielding the term, exist. Michaels, supra note 267.
Other such definitions include the following: “A specific way in which values,
practices and concepts are integrated into the operation of legal institutions and
the interpretation of legal texts.” Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal
Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Com-
parative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495 (1998) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). A further variation is as follows: “ ‘[C]ulture’ concerns frameworks of
intangibles within which interpretive communities operate and which have nor-
mative force for these communities. . . . Because rules are but the outward mani-
festation of an implicit structure of attitude and reference, they are a reflection of
a given legal culture.” Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converg-
ing, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 56–57 (1996).
270. FRIEDMAN, 1977, supra note 159, at 76. According to Friedman, legal culture ex-
udes “lines of force, pressures, and demands that envelop legal institutions and
ultimately determine their shape.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF
CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 4 (1990) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, 1990].
271. Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1996). Friedman would refer to the law in lawyers’
heads that LoPucki describes as “internal legal culture”—the attitudes and val-
ues of professionals that work within the legal system. FRIEDMAN, 1977, supra
note 159, at 76; FRIEDMAN, 1990, supra note 270, at 4. External legal culture
would be the attitudes and values towards law of the general public. See FRIED-
MAN, 1990, supra note 270, at 4.
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tiality, how and into what they form it through their co-operation, how and in
what way they conceptuali[z]e it, and in what spirit, frame and purpose they
make it the subject of theoretical representation and operation.272
If we currently conceptualize legal culture as a societal force that
transforms the law on the books (black-letter law) into the law in ac-
tion (law as it is experienced by the governed), how will cryptolaw con-
ceptualize legal culture in the context of crypto-legal structures?
There are arguably at least two possible lines of impact. First, crypto-
legal structures could so narrow the gap between the black-letter law
and the law in action that legal culture evaporates as both a concept
and as an agent of legal change. Second, if the black-letter law is the
law as it is written by legislatures and crypto-legal structures are self-
executing, we might conceive crypto-legal structures as law in action,
suggesting that the locus of legal culture will shift from professionals
in the field to the developers that code crypto-legal structures.
1. Cryptolaw Envisions a World Without Law Lag
The legal culture prevailing in the current regulatory system de-
pends upon consensus and assumes value in the “long, drawn-out
feedback process that involves hearings, proposed rules, the submis-
sion of comment letters, and finally agency lawyers finalizing a rule
after considering the comments.”273 Product development, on the
other hand, happens very quickly.274 The result is that “[n]ew regula-
tions pertaining to an innovative product could be obsolete before they
are finalized.”275 In fact, “[t]he growing number of rule enactments,
revisions, and revocations suggests that existing rules and institu-
tional structures for rulemaking are becoming less capable of address-
ing the rapid pace of change.”276
This conception of law lag277 applies the law on the books com-
pared to the law-in-action concept from the study of legal culture to
the field of law and technology. Implementing the law on the books
through DLT will enable real-time feedback that could narrow or elim-
inate law lag. Essentially, the crypto-legal structure will be the law in
action. When product development in the industry is no longer com-
272. Csaba Varga, Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law, 46
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 177, 182 (2005).
273. Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 19–20.
274. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
275. Id. (citing Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, FINTECH L. REP.,
Mar.–Apr. 2015, at 10).
276. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Eco-
nomics Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER 1211,
1212 (Wulf A. Kaal, Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2013).
277. Priest, supra note 248, at 302 (describing the difficulties of various regulatory
models in “adapting . . . over time to new conditions, and monitoring compli-
ance . . . for the benefit of the citizenry”).
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patible with current crypto-legal structures, compliant industry actors
would approach regulators with the technical mismatch, and the
software developers that initially coded the crypto-legal structure
would work with industry to adjust the code implementation to uphold
the law while also enabling industry to maintain compliance even
while innovating. In other words, computer code can be adapted more
quickly to changing technology than natural-language statutes inter-
preted by regulatory agencies struggling to keep pace with technologi-
cal changes. If crypto-legal structures can be continually adapted by
the software developers that code them in order to adjust to changing
industry uses of technology, the concept of a separate legal culture
that helps shape the law as it is carried out in society may diminish or
evaporate altogether. The law in lawyers’ heads278 will no longer sig-
nificantly sway developments in a substantive area of law. Instead,
crypto-legal developments would be driven more directly by
technologists.
2. Cryptolaw Anticipates that Developers Writing Code May
Determine Crypto-Legal Culture More than Lawyers
Advanced technology systems, such as predictive technology and
DLT, “are sometimes thought to exist independently of human rule-
making, and governed only by mathematical algorithms. This is a mis-
conception. Just like legal code, technical code needs to be produced
and maintained by humans who define the rules that the code embod-
ies.”279 Lessig put it this way: “If code is law, then . . . ‘control of code
is power.’”280 If law is implemented through crypto-legal structures
and those crypto-legal structures are written by software developers
that control the code, then the culture of those software developers is
likely to impact the law. It will be the social reality of the coders and
the language of code that influences legal compliance and disputes
rather than the social reality of a community of lawyers and their cli-
ents. Technologists, untrained in legal theory, being overseen by regu-
lators, many of whom are not lawyers and most of whom cannot read
or write computer code, will become the locus of legal culture. What
impact will that shift in legal culture have on law practice and legal
education? What impact will the shift have on approaches to dispute
resolution, motion practice, and discovery strategy? What impact on
contract negotiation? Would the shift reduce the frequency with which
companies choose business strategies that involve regulatory entre-
278. See LoPucki, supra note 271.
279. Vili Lehdonvirta & Robleh Ali, Governance and Regulation, in DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 40, 43 (2016), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distri
buted-ledger-technology.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5R55-4M3S].
280. LAWS OF CYBERPSACE I, supra note 155, at 60 (quoting William Mitchell).
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preneurship?281 The implications of cryptolaw for changing substan-
tive law, reshaping legal structures, and shifting the center of legal
culture away from lawyers and toward technologists raises significant
challenges, implications, and consequences of adopting crypto-legal
structures.
V. CHALLENGES, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ADOPTING CRYPTO-LEGAL STRUCTURES
This Article predicts that, in areas of law that will benefit from one
or more of the elements of the DLT service bundle, transplanting ex-
isting legal rules into DLT-based, smart-contracting, semi-autono-
mous, self-executing, adaptable computer code will simplify
substantive law, lead to the emergence of new regulatory actors, shift
the locus of legal culture from lawyers to coders, and decrease the lag
between law and technology. Even anticipating these changes, how-
ever, the emergence of crypto-legal structures will present other chal-
lenges, implications, and consequences. This Part identifies three
nonexhaustive areas that each merit careful consideration during the
construction and implementation of crypto-legal structures and con-
siders the implications and consequences of each for the law. First, a
crypto-legal structure will not be appropriate for use in every area of
the law; lawmakers and regulators will need to draw boundaries
around the cryptolaw’s scope. Second, the legal system must prepare
to respond to and adjudicate unexpected consequences of crypto-legal
structures. Third, because cryptolaw will alter fundamental elements
of the legal system, civil society may respond unfavorably to such sig-
nificant changes and react either by creating a shadow society of
noncompliant institutions or by creating alternative public–private
distributed-governance partnerships that encourage diverse, endoge-
nous, responsive regulation. Either scenario would have significant
implications and consequences for the law.
A. Drawing Boundaries Around Cryptolaw’s Scope
This Article does not assert or assume that every aspect of the law
is appropriate for transplantation into a crypto-legal structure. The
body of cryptolaw that emerges will not likely be one in which the en-
tirety of any given legal system resides in DLT-based computer code.
Rather, as explained in section II.A., crypto-legal structures should be
281. For a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of regulatory entrepreneurship, see
Pollman & Barry, supra note 101. On the theory, which should be explored fur-
ther, that companies would be less likely to resort to regulatory entrepreneurship
if their business culture and language were more readily understood by regula-
tors, regulation implemented by technologists might bridge the communication
gap and reduce the need for business models based on regulatory
entrepreneurship.
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considered for implementation in those areas of law beset by some
problem that can be addressed by one or more elements of the core
DLT service bundle. Even with that initial limitation, one of the key
challenges for cryptolaw will be the challenge faced by regulators in
selecting an appropriately ripe legal system for transplantation into
crypto-legal structures. Additional criteria that may assist in drawing
scope boundaries for emerging crypto-legal structures include: (1) that
the legal structure being transplanted into cryptolaw be a concrete le-
gal structure that is part of a concrete legal system; (2) that the legal
structure transplanted to cryptolaw not, at least initially, serve a
function of physically restraining a person; and (3) that the trans-
planted legal structure be one of broad-based application rather than
one of individual behavior modification.
As to the first criterion, systems analysis is best applied to concrete
systems, a system “that exists in ‘physical space-time’ and is composed
of real people and/or other physical objects.”282 The examples of the
BSA Regulations and the Article 9 filing systems meet this criterion.
The BSA Regulations govern financial institutions and their custom-
ers, which are real people and operate in real time and space using
real funds. The Article 9 filing system, for its part, governs the inter-
actions between real people regarding property interests in, posses-
sion of, and the right to repayment from real objects of personal
property, and the filing system itself is managed by an office manned
by filing officers reviewing paper files and working on computer hard-
ware. The common law, even if it could otherwise benefit from one or
more of the elements of the DLT service bundle, on the other hand,
would be an example of a legal system that does not fit this criterion.
Instead, as an abstract body of legal rules, the common law is more in
the nature of a “conceptual system.”283 The first criterion thus enables
lawmakers to consider some legal structures or legal subsystems as
out of cryptolaw’s scope even when it might otherwise seem to benefit
from some aspect of DLT.
As to the second criterion, because crypto-legal structures will self-
execute and, as discussed further below, some code choices may lead to
unexpected results, legal subsystems that govern physical restraint of
people or things should be out of cryptolaw’s scope. For example, even
if, as part of reforming the Article 9 filing system, DLT could be used
to automatically disable some piece of equipment (e.g., farming equip-
ment such as a tractor or construction equipment such as a hoist) so
that it would no longer work upon a debtor’s default, that function
should be beyond the scope of cryptolaw for at least two reasons. First,
the code will self-execute upon the debtor’s default. The debtor may be
in the midst of operating the equipment and it may be dangerous to
282. LoPucki, supra note 176, at 488 (footnote omitted).
283. Id.
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the safety of the debtor or others for the equipment to become disabled
during active use. The code will not know the circumstances of the
equipment at the time it is disabled, and the code will not care. Sec-
ond, as further detailed below, coding smart contracts can be difficult
and complex, and the more elaborate the coding, the more likely the
smart contract may result in unexpected effects. For example, the
code may suffer an error that disables the equipment inappropriately
and causes new legal problems resulting from what would effectively
be an unlawful repossession of the property (a conversion lawsuit, for
example), in addition to any threats to the safety of people near to or
operating the machinery at the time it became disabled. As to the
third criterion, Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett suggest that in-
creasing use of technology in the design, implementation, and enforce-
ment of law may encroach on the privacy, autonomy, and ethical
domain currently reserved for individuals.284 This may suggest that
crypto-legal structures are better suited for broad-based legal systems
and subsystems, such as the BSA Regulations and the Article 9 filing
system, and less appropriate for enforcing compliance with crosswalk
signals, traffic lights, and other rules governing individual behavior.
Applying these criteria when selecting legal structures ripe for
transplantation into crypto-legal structures will not wholly eliminate
the challenge of defining cryptolaw’s scope. Other criteria for consider-
ation will emerge organically as initial crypto-legal structures are de-
veloped. Further, as initial crypto-legal structures are implemented,
in keeping with the prediction of legal-transplant theory, the crypto-
legal structures may not behave as intended or expected. The unex-
pected results will not automatically signal that the crypto-legal struc-
ture failed but may give rise to both new challenges related to the
scope of cryptolaw and related to other aspects of creating and imple-
menting crypto-legal structures.
B. Expecting Unexpected Results
Correctly coding smart contracts to accomplish the task desired in
the manner desired can be especially difficult as compared to tradi-
tional software programming.285 Furthermore, the nature of DLT is
such that even a small error can have significant effects.286 The ex-
284. Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 49–54.
285. KEVIN DELMOLINO ET AL., STEP BY STEP TOWARDS CREATING A SAFE SMART CON-
TRACT: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM A CRYPTOCURRENCY LAB, http://fc16.ifca.ai/
bitcoin/papers/DAKMS16.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6Y4K-T3H2] (“Our lab ex-
periences show that even for very simple smart contracts (e.g., a ‘Rock, Paper,
Scissors’ game), designing and implementing them correctly was highly non-
trivial.”).
286. Id. (“In contrast to traditional software development tasks where bugs such as
buffer overflows are often benign (except in rare or contrived scenarios), in our
lab, we observed several bugs and pitfalls that arise due to the unique nature of
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ploit of a flaw in the code of The DAO287 offers a clear example of
complex smart contracting computer code leading to unexpected re-
sults.288 The DAO essentially operated as a decentralized venture-
capital fund,289 “borne from immutable, unstoppable, and irrefutable
computer code, operated entirely by its members, and fueled using
ETH.”290 One of its participants exploited a known bug (that program-
mers were actively working to fix) in The DAO’s code to divert 3.6
million ether (ETH), roughly valued at fifty million dollars, into a
“child DAO” that only that participant controlled.291 The ongoing dis-
pute regarding how to respond to the exploit is beyond the scope of
this Article.292 The relevance here is that even some of the most so-
phisticated coders in the field293 were surprised by unexpected effects
of the computer code they had created. This has important implica-
tions for the possibility of using DLT to code self-enforcing, semi-au-
tonomous legal rules.
smart contract programs and lead to clear and immediate exploits (e.g., theft or
loss of money).”).
287. David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016), http://
www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists [https://perma.unl.edu/
937A-6BH4] (“A DAO is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization. Its goal is to
codify the rules and decisionmaking apparatus of an organization, eliminating
the need for documents and people in governing, creating a structure with decen-
tralized control. . . . ‘The DAO’ is the name of a particular DAO, conceived of and
programmed by the team behind the German startup Slock.it—a company build-
ing ‘smart locks’ that let people share their things (cars, boats, apartments) in a
decentralized version of Airbnb.”).
288. Paul Vigna, Chiefless Company Rakes in More than $100 Million, WALL STREET J.
(May 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chiefless-company-rakes-in-more-
than-100-million-1463399393.
289. David Z. Morris, Leaderless, Blockchain-Based Venture Capital Fund Raises $100
Million, and Counting, FORTUNE (May 15, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/15/
leaderless-blockchain-vc-fund [https://perma.unl.edu/YF7Q-TLD8].
290. Matt Levine, Blockchain Company Wants to Reinvent Companies, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (May 17, 2016) (quoting The DAO’s “Principles” page, which is no longer
available), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-17/blockchain-com-
pany-wants-to-reinvent-companies [https://perma.unl.edu/JT79-V8M8].
291. Siegel, supra note 287.
292. For more information on the aftermath of the “hack” and the proposed responses,
see generally Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to
Return DAO Funds, COINDESK (July 20, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/ether-
eum-executes-blockchain-hard-fork-return-dao-investor-funds [https://perma.unl
.edu/D5RX-MXT8]; Siegel, supra note 287.
293. DIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 54 (“Christoph Jentzsch, who programmed The DAO—
which was subsequently hacked and lost $50,000,000—is an Ethereum veteran
with a university degree in theoretical and mathematical physics. He is not a
seasoned coder or software system architect. But he is a smart guy who under-
stands Ethereum. He even had professional experience as a software tester. But
decentralized code can be exceedingly hard to test. That even he can trip up,
predicts that a lot of people trying their hands at smart contracts will.”).
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If The DAO’s code was a crypto-legal structure, the exploit and the
resulting diversion of funds to the child DAO would have called into
question the role of the regulators that oversaw the transplant of the
existing legal structure into DLT and any resulting civil or other lia-
bility for their actions in that role. To be held responsible, the regula-
tors filling the role must be able to work with the coders, understand
the work as it is ongoing, and be proficient enough in coding to be able
to conduct an independent review of the crypto-legal structure after it
has been created. Similarly, for a citizen affected by a bug or exploit of
a crypto-legal structure, to pursue any rights he or she may have in
relation to the problem, the citizen’s attorney must be proficient
enough in computer coding and DLT to effectively assess the evidence
and craft a legal strategy. Thus, to expect the unexpected results for
which legal-transplant literature instructs us to prepare, we need reg-
ulators and attorneys that can write, read, and understand computer
code. This implication of cryptolaw will have important effects on the
legal profession that extend beyond the changes to the fundamental
elements of the legal system discussed in Part II above, suggesting
that it merits its own treatment in separate work.
C. Cryptolaw Will Encourage Discourse Regarding
Alternative Governance Models
The existence of the regulatory state, as well as the availability of civil and,
potentially, criminal avenues for the redress of grievances, are so much with
us that we accept them as given: we presume that government and its various
agents exist to serve as buffers—to protect us from harms beyond our con-
trol—and that there will always be a way in which to seek a remedy against or
to prosecute those who have done us harm.294
This customary approach of the governed to interact with the laws by
which they are governed is shaped by the legal structures themselves.
The two are connected. As cryptolaw causes subtle shifts in substan-
tive law, legal structures, and legal culture, the governed may chafe
against the weight of automatically executing laws that shape their
daily activity. Furthermore, as cryptolaw works to overcome its chal-
lenges and society confronts the implications of its existence, society
may discover that carrying law and regulation to its logical conclusion
through semi-autonomous, self-executing computer code reveals deep-
seeded flaws in the law or the theory underpinning the law in clearer
ways than ever before. In either case, civil society may respond in one
of two ways: (1) build a separate set of institutions that do not incorpo-
rate crypto-legal structures and effectively operate in a shadow society
or (2) push for more endogenous forms of governance models at a vari-
294. Lawrence Friedman, Digital Communications Technology and New Possibilities
for Private Ordering, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57, 60–61 (2003) [hereinafter
Friedman, Digital Communications Technology].
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ety of levels, including political, social, business, and corporate gov-
ernance. Although the second option is normatively preferable, the
first has historical precedent and is likely easier to create an alterna-
tive to forced compliance with law through crypto-legal structures. It
is also entirely possible that both possibilities emerge simultaneously,
radically altering the enforcement landscape.
If civil society responds to the challenges and unexpected conse-
quences of cryptolaw with disfavor, a significant portion of civil society
may opt not to use crypto-legal structures. Civil society actors may
instead opt to build noncompliant businesses, communities, and com-
merce models. In other words, in a world where the law prefers crypto-
legal structures that some part of the governed disfavor, a shadow so-
ciety of noncompliant people, entities, commerce, and communities
may emerge. The emergence of this shadow society will require
lawmakers and regulators to determine: (1) whether any penalty for
failure to use the crypto-legal structure will be imposed; (2) if so, what
kind of penalty; and (3) how to determine when the penalty applies in
the face of constitutional defenses such as exercise of speech or relig-
ion, or constitutional criminal protections.295 Lawmakers and regula-
tors will also be called upon to determine whether the shadow society’s
existence has any societal, socioeconomic, or social justice implications
that render cryptolaw a less desirable form of law than first esti-
mated. None of these issues are new to the law, but they will be new in
a law-and-technology context that will have already shifted some of
the fundamental elements of the system by implementing crypto-legal
structures.
The second possibility is that new, more creative forms of
partnered governance will emerge using DLT. Although a call for
more transparent, more citizen-responsive law is not new, DLT will
offer average citizens greater opportunity to create, manage, and
widely disseminate governance models that better reflect their inter-
ests, values, and goals.296 After experiencing the power of DLT when
it is backed by the power of the state, some groups may be emboldened
to attempt more elaborate forms of governance through private order-
ing using a private form of crypto-legal structures. Such a phenome-
non has loosely developed in the context of the Internet.
As Friedman explained, “[I]n addition to enabling new forms of in-
terpersonal communication, [the Internet] has also become a social
295. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445
(2013) (arguing that First Amendment law may need to be adjusted to address
decisions based on algorithms); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated
Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016)
(analyzing Automated Suspicion Algorithms under the Fourth Amendment).
296. For an example of a platform experimenting with this, see BACKFEED, http://
backfeed.cc [https://perma.unl.edu/ZM3J-8LJY].
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space whose discrete sectors feature their own developing norms of
regulation and redress, many of which depart from their physical
world analogs.”297 The private ordering taking place on the Internet,
of course, simply represents a technologically enhanced version of the
same phenomenon that repeatedly appears in different communities
throughout history. For example, lex mercatoria represented a global
set of norms created by merchants for use in conducting affairs with
other merchants across the globe during the Middle Ages.298 A private
law of international commerce,299 a law merchant for the Internet (lex
informatica),300 and other examples abound.301 Aaron Wright and
Primavera de Filippi already predict the emergence of private rules
systems in DLT.302 Arguably, the lex cryptographia that they predict,
however, will be limited to specialized groups proficient in DLT or op-
erating DLT-related businesses. The question then becomes whether
and how the experience of such specialized groups in building private
systems to govern their affairs will meld with the more public, state-
backed form of lawmaking through DLT. In other words, how might
public law, or state-backed law, begin to form through private order-
ing? Could DLT enable communities to endogenously build and pro-
pose norms and rules that, through crypto-legal structures, possess
more than mere “soft power” in their communities? In doing so, could
cryptolaw allow more diversity in substantive and procedural law that
297. Friedman, Digital Communications Technology, supra note 294, at 61 (citing
David H. Gleason & Lawrence Friedman, Toward an Accessible Conception of
Cyberspace, 28 VT. L. REV. 299 (2003)).
298. Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 447, 448 (2007) (“The first stage concerns an ancient lex mercatoria
in the Middle Ages, a transitional set of norms and procedural principles, estab-
lished by and for commerce in (relative) autonomy from states.” (citing HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION 332–56 (1983); LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIR-
TEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. eds.,
1998))).
299. Id. at 448 (“The second stage describes the renaissance of the idea as a ‘new lex
mercatoria’ in the 20th century, an informal and flexible net of rules and arbitra-
tors establishing a private international commercial law.” (citing J.H. Dalhuisen,
Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Com-
mercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 129 (2006))).
300. See generally Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet,
5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211 (1997) (describing an independent, or private,
system of law for governing transactions on the Internet).
301. See e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 27–28 (1983) (looking at
the experience of seventeenth-century American colonists in using nonlegal dis-
pute resolution); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (detailing
how the community of cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, used private
ordering to govern inter-neighbor affairs).
302. See generally Wright & De Filippi, supra note 19.
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better reflects the communities that it governs and the socioeconomic
realities that those communities face?303
VI. CONCLUSION
Using comparative law as a methodological paradigm, this Article
conceptualizes the contours of a new legal discourse regarding the im-
pact on the legal system resulting from the use of DLT to implement,
enforce, and adjudicate law. In so doing, this Article predicts that the
current fledging phenomenon of creating crypto-legal structures will
expand in the near and long term, and argues that such DLT-enabled
law is poised to change the basic structures of any legal system using
it, including basic ideas about the nature of law and the process of
adjudication. Recognizing that DLT is not a panacea, this Article first
confines cryptolaw to a discussion about the application of DLT to
problems in lawmaking, regulation, and enforcement that relate to the
law’s inability to enable actors to reach a consensus about the exis-
tence and evolution of shared facts. Further, the Article recognizes
that some areas of the law will be better suited to crypto-legal struc-
tures than others because of their concrete nature. Within those
boundaries, however, those designing crypto-legal structures should
feel free to remedy the problem with whichever combination of the five
elements of the blockchain service bundle is deemed appropriate
under the circumstances.
With these preliminary boundaries of the cryptolaw discourse in
mind, the Article uses comparative law as a framework for predicting
other important areas of discussion and inquiry. First, creating
crypto-legal structures should be thought of as an exercise in legal
transplantation, transplanting a law into the foreign legal system of
DLT computer code. As legal transplantation, those designing crypto-
legal structures should use functional equivalents in the code as an
opportunity to simplify substantive law. The legal system using
crypto-legal structures should also prepare for the emergence of new,
and sometimes unexpected, results, including the emergence of new
regulatory actors. Cryptolaw offers a way to think about these new
elements, anticipating specifically the impact of self-executing ele-
ments of the computer code and the software developers that create
the crypto-legal structures. Cryptolaw also offers a framework for con-
sidering the impact of crypto-legal structures on legal culture, sug-
gesting that the gap between the law in action and the law in the
303. These questions suggest the emergence of new crypto-governance models. Sev-
eral areas are ripe for exploration of such models: corporate governance, contract
theory, public and community governance models, and law-and-development the-
ory, to name a few. Each such area deserves its own thorough examination. I
mention them here only to emphasize the far-reaching implications of cryptolaw’s
potential effect on governance through legal and other mechanisms.
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books may disappear and that legal culture itself may change as the
increased involvement of software developers eliminates the role of in-
dividual legal professionals interpreting law in the field.
In sum, by offering an initial picture of the impact on legal systems
of a world using crypto-legal structures to address perceived ineffi-
ciencies and complexity in the law, this Article launches a new dis-
course. This new cryptolaw discourse will stand on its own as a new
field of legal academic inquiry and area of legal practice. It will de-
velop new substantive questions of law, issues for adjudication, and
name new types of legal actors. Notably, the cryptolaw discourse will
require interdisciplinary discussion. First, cryptolaw will disrupt
other adjacent areas of law, such as administrative law, commercial
and corporate law, contracts, and torts, among others. Second, over-
coming the challenges and accounting for the collateral implications
and consequences of using crypto-legal structures will require in-
creased dialogue between those trained in the disciplines of law and
policy and those trained in the disciplines of computer science and
mathematics. To realize the potential of crypto-legal structures for in-
creasing efficiency, transparency, and equity in governance, this Arti-
cle calls upon those currently designing crypto-legal structures for
governments and public–private partnerships to first undertake a
cryptolaw analysis of the type conceptualized here. Ultimately, the
idea that new, more transparent, more endogenous, more culturally
appropriate governance models might emerge in response to chal-
lenges arising from using crypto-legal structures hints at the true ex-
panse of cryptolaw’s promise: although every law and legal theory
continually evolves in an effort to better serve the governed, cryptolaw
offers a legal discourse that anticipates doing so more rapidly, more
efficiently, more transparently, and in new and creative ways that
may encourage increased civic engagement.
